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INTRODUCTION

Patents and copyrights originate from the same constitutional
source of law,1 and for this reason they are in some respects similar.
Patent and copyright law alike extend to inventors and authors
exclusive rights over the fruits of their intellectual labors, enabling
owners to extract value from intangible goods that would otherwise
not be profitable. 2 Both systems are premised on a utilitarian bargain,
allowing inventors and authors to have socially costly monopoly
interests in their inventions and works in order to encourage socially
beneficial innovative and artistic production. 3 And patents and
copyrights both last only for finite periods, in contrast to the
perpetuity of most property interests, in order to both enrich the

1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....").
2.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners); 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1) (2006) (enumerating exclusive rights of patent owners).
3.
Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) ('The rights of
a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 'carefully crafted bargain' under which, once the
patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and
without attribution.").
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public domain and enable the creation of follow-on inventions and
4
works of authorship.
Yet, in at least one salient respect,5 patents and copyrights are
quite different. Patents vest only after an applicant successfully
navigates a cumbersome examination process administered by the
federal Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Copyrights, by contrast,
arise costlessly and often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression. 6 Patents, in
other words, are very costly to acquire, while acquiring a copyright
costs authors almost nothing at all.
That patents and copyrights vest so differently raises a
problem, and presents a puzzle. The problem-at least purportedly-is
that each of these vesting systems generates social costs far in excess
of its benefits. Critics of the patent system charge that the
examination process represents a classic deadweight loss, imposing
prohibitive costs on patentees while generating no offsetting benefits
by screening out invalid or ineffectual patents. 7 Critics of the
copyright system charge that by extending exclusive rights to just
about any work of authorship, society suffers from a glut of copyrights
that deters future creation by imposing information and transaction
8
costs on would-be authors.
In this Article, we question this conventional wisdom, arguing
that the costliness of patents and the costlessness of copyrights have
positive, rather than negative, effects on social welfare. The first step
of our argument leverages emergent insights from the economic
literature about costly screening processes. As scholars have observed
in other settings, burdensome processes for vesting legal rights have
social costs and benefits apart from the substantive end they are
meant to serve. Such processes are costly screens, forcing actors who
seek to acquire legal rights to consider whether acquisition of the right
4.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (establishing a term of seventy years after the death of the author for
most copyrights); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (establishing patent duration of twenty years from effective
date of filing).
5.
Of course, patent and copyright differ in many other respects. For example, patent law
extends to inventors broader exclusive rights than copyright law extends to authors, a point that
we return to in detail below. See infra Parts II, III.
6.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... ").
7.

See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE

COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (critiquing the current patent vesting system).
8.
See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 613-30 (2010) ("[A]tomistic copyright causes information and
transaction cost problems."); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576-79 (2005) (observing that copyright law increasingly protects smaller
"microworks," and that this trend is problematic).
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will be worth the cost of doing so. Such screens cause actors to selfselect against acquisition of rights that will not generate much private
value, and limit the vesting of those rights for reasons unrelated to the
substantive content of the process itself.
Bringing this insight to bear on intellectual property ("IP")
casts the vesting of both patents and copyrights in a new light. The
much-maligned patent examination process functions as a classic
costly screen. It deters applicants from seeking patents when the
value of the exclusive right is less than the price of overcoming the
screen. Moreover, because of a distinctive asymmetry in patent law's
generation of social and private value, the effect of this screen is to
deter the production only of those low private value patents that also
have low (or negative) social value. Examined in this light, the costly
examination process is not a deadweight loss at all, but an efficient
way to exclude the very kind of patents most likely to generate
anticommons concerns.
Process costs-or, more accurately, their absence-also help
explain why copyright's oft-criticized low vesting threshold generates
social benefits in ways unappreciated by its critics. Because copyright
law constructs authors' property rights differently-and much more
narrowly-than patent law constructs property rights, it produces
very different private/social value asymmetries. If law were to impose
a costly screen as a precondition of copyright vesting, such a screen
would exact social costs well in excess of any benefits it produced.
Costly copyrights would preclude the creation of only innocuous works
of authorship, thereby failing to generate any meaningful social value.
Process costs for copyright vesting would, however, deter the creation
of works that have low value for their author but high value for the
public-thus precluding production of one of the paradigmatic kinds of
work that copyright was designed to create.
Refracting the patent and copyright vesting systems through
the lens of costly screen theory thus enables us to tell a very different
story than the one currently animating most writing on this topic.
Rather than regarding the patent examination process (and the lack of
any process for acquiring copyrights) as social problems, we show that
they are in fact beneficial ways to maximize social welfare from IP
production.
But application of costly screen theory not only reconfigures
the conventional normative account of vesting IP rights, it also
provides a solution to a longstanding, related puzzle. Scholars have
often asked why law creates such different vesting thresholds for
copyrights and patents. This question has often been addressed in the
literature, but without a satisfactory conclusion. We argue that costly
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screens provide a complete and parsimonious answer to this puzzle,
and indeed that this insight allows us to craft more generally a theory
of IP process. Our answer to this problem does not rely, as other
accounts have, on the mere fact that copyrights and patents extend
differential strengths of property rights to owners. Rather, we suggest
that there is a complex interrelationship between the breadth of
exclusive rights in information, the social/private value asymmetries
those rights generate, and the optimal process that should govern how
those rights vest. Indeed, we claim that this insight may be abstracted
to the law more generally, and conclude by briefly examining related
fields where costly screen theory can make sense of a purportedly
suboptimal process (or the purportedly suboptimal lack of such a
process).
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the
essentials of costly screen analysis, providing a basis for the
discussion that follows. Part II applies these ideas in the patent
setting, arguing that the supposedly wasteful patent examination
process actually enhances social welfare because it encourages
efficient self-selection by patentees. Part III makes a similar move in
the context of copyrights, showing by means of a counterfactual
thought experiment that imposition of costly screens as a prerequisite
to vesting exclusive rights in works of authorship would be
counterproductive because it would preclude the creation of many
highly socially valuable works. Part IV generalizes these insights in
two ways. First, it articulates a general theory of IP process that
illuminates a basic relationship between the statutory construction of
exclusive rights in information and the means by which those rights
should vest. Second, it extrapolates our argument outside the IP
context, showing that elaborate processes (or the conspicuous lack of
any such process) for vesting legal rights may be socially beneficial in
ways that their critics have failed to appreciate.
I.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF COSTLY SCREENS

Costly screens-which we define as the price that an actor
must pay to the government in order to take a given action-are
ubiquitous. If you want to (legally) drive a car, you have to get a
license from the local Department of Motor Vehicles, remit the
requisite fees, and successfully undergo a basic competency
evaluation. Owners who want to develop or significantly modify their
real property must seek permits from and pay fees to the relevant
local building authority. Similarly, operators of businesses must
comply with federal regulations that often impose permit
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requirements on operations likely to produce noxious effluents. Many,
and possibly most, activities that may impose large-scale externalities
require their agents to navigate a costly screen in one way or another. 9
These screens are often understood in terms of the content of
the processes themselves. Licensing requirements evaluate driver skill
to assure that the streets are not crowded with dangerously
incompetent motorists. Permitting requirements for construction
encourage compliance with building codes designed to ensure safety,
while similar requirements for manufacturing encourage compliance
with federal regulations designed to reduce pollution. Yet this
standard account cannot explain all aspects of such screening
processes. Requiring payment of a license or permit fee merely raises
the costs of acquiring these rights, and does not appear to have any
nexus with driver competence or building safety. And many screening
processes have been shown to lack any meaningful substantive bite, 10
so that they more closely resemble a byzantine bureaucratic maze
than a serious evaluation of an actor's competence or safety.
In light of the shortcomings of this standard explanation, an
alternative account-which we refer to throughout this Article as
costly screen theory-has emerged.11 Its exponents, increasingly
numerous in the legal academy, have argued that cumbersome
procedural requirements have social value not because of their
substantive accuracy, but simply because some actors cannot afford to
pay the price associated with these costly screens, and are thus
precluded from acquiring the associated rights. So long as costly
screens select against those actors whose exercise of the right at issue
would be socially counterproductive, such screens enhance aggregate
welfare value regardless of the substance of the process that they
12
impose.
9.
There are conspicuous exceptions. People are free to have children absent any licensing
requirement, and regardless of their parental fitness.
10. We discuss several of these types of processes below. See infra Part IV.B.
11. Scholars have applied costly screen theory in various legal settings. See, e.g., Hans
Gersbach, The Money-Burning Refinement: With An Application to A PoliticalSignaling Game,
33 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 67, 72-86 (2004); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising
Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies
with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive PoliticalTheory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 116061 (2001); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 561 (1973); Matthew C.
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "HardLook" JudicialReview, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753
(2006); Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between Screening and
Signaling Models, in PAPERS IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY SEMINAR AT

OXFORD UNIVERSITY (Michael Dempster ed., 1989).
12. Indeed, costly screen theory is agnostic as to the content of the screen itself. A fee in the
amount of X on actors is functionally equivalent to a process that requires no fee but imposes
transaction costs equivalent to X.
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To illustrate how costly screens can affect and sometimes
enhance the production of goods, consider an imaginary firm called
DouglasCo. 13 DouglasCo manufactures a product called Bairds, but its
manufacturing process also generates social costs in the form of
pollution. 14 Society thus wants DouglasCo to manufacture Bairds, but
only when their production enhances social welfare-that is, only
when the private value of producing Bairds (i.e., the profits they
generate for DouglasCo) exceeds the social costs of their production
(i.e., pollution). The problem, though, is that DouglasCo cannot be
counted on to limit its production by reference to this calculus because
its production operates independently of any aggregate social welfare
analysis. DouglasCo will continue to manufacture Bairds whenever
they create private value for the firm because it does not, by
assumption, bear the social costs of its pollution. 15
Now imagine that a government actor, Regulator, is charged
with addressing this problem. How can Regulator limit instances in
which DouglasCo's production of Bairds produces a socially harmful
amount of pollution? Regulator would love to simply ban production
where the social costs of producing Bairds are greater than the private
value they create, but she cannot enact this ban because the private
value of making Bairds is a fact known only to DouglasCo.
Costly screens may provide a solution to this difficulty.
Regulator could simply impose on DouglasCo a price-say, a permit
fee-in order to obtain the right to produce Bairds. If the permit fee is
greater than the private value that DouglasCo generates by producing
Bairds, then DouglasCo will simply cease production. Where
DouglasCo's manufacture of Bairds creates more pollution than it does
private value, Regulator's imposition of a costly screen to stymie the
firm's production is a welfare-maximizing outcome.
But there is no guarantee that the costly screen will block
DouglasCo from producing Bairds in all cases when producing Bairds
is welfare diminishing, and no guarantee that the costly screen will
not block DouglasCo from producing Bairds when producing Bairds is
welfare enhancing. Regulator's costly screen will stop DouglasCo's
production whenever the screen makes production of Bairds a losing
proposition for the firm, including even those instances where
13. We would like to thank our mentor and colleague Douglas Baird for tolerating our use of
his name in connection with this hypothetical.
14. We make the simplifying assumption that the only social cost exacted by DouglasCo's
production of Bairds is pollution. In reality, the social costs of producing any good are much more
varied.
15. In more formal terms, we would say that the social costs of DouglasCo's manufacture of
Bairds are not internalized.
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production creates no pollution. 16 The fundamental problem is that
DouglasCo will react based on how the costly screen compares to the
private value of producing Bairds, while Regulator really cares about
the social value of producing Bairds, which depends on the amount of
pollution generated.
Given this mismatch, is it ever possible for Regulator to impose
costly screens in a way that is likely to enhance social welfare? We
think the answer is yes, and in order to illustrate how, we introduce
one more variation to this extended hypothetical. Assume that
DouglasCo makes two kinds of Bairds, A and B. Imagine that Baird A
earns DouglasCo significant profits and usually (but not always)
results in relatively little pollution. In other words, making Baird A is
always a winning proposition for DouglasCo and often (but not
always) a winning proposition for society at large. Baird B, by
contrast, earns DouglasCo much less by way of profit, but it invariably
generates significant pollution. In other words, making Baird B is
(barely) a winning proposition for DouglasCo, but it is always a losing
proposition for society. Let's assume further that Regulator has no
idea beforehand whether DouglasCo is making Baird A or Baird B,
even after the goods have hit the marketplace. (This may seem like a
contrived set of circumstances, but we will demonstrate later that a
great proportion of intellectual property actually does have these
features.)
Under these circumstances, Regulator can use costly screens to
exploit the asymmetry between the private value that the Bairds
create for DouglasCo and the public value that they generate for
society at large. As we have seen, Baird A sometimes creates social
benefits and sometimes does not, but it always generates value for
DouglasCo. By contrast, Baird B is always harmful to society, and
only sometimes generates value for DouglasCo. 17 So, if Regulator can
at least determine the value that Baird B creates for DouglasCo, it can
set a costly screen priced at, or slightly above, that value. This screen
will make it so that DouglasCo will no longer produce Baird B (since
the screen would cost more than the profits generated by that good),
but will not preclude production of Baird A (since the profits from

16. The story is actually a little bit more complicated because the imposition of the screen
itself is a social cost that must be reflected in the cost-benefit analysis, so the screen is desirable
only where the private value of making Bairds exceeds both the pollution generated by the
manufacturing process and the cost to DouglasCo of navigating the screen.
17. One might wonder why DouglasCo would bother making Baird B at all, since Baird A is
consistently more profitable for the firm. It may do so because Baird A is difficult to produce, and
cannot be generated with any regularity. While this may seem odd, we will demonstrate that this
too is a feature common to copyrights and patents.
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making Baird A remain greater than the costs imposed by the screen).
Here, then, Regulator's costly screen is welfare enhancing because it
blocks production of a socially costly good while continuing to allow
18
production of a (frequently) socially beneficial one.
Consider as well this variation: What if production of Baird B,
despite its marginal profitability for DouglasCo, sometimes led to
massive pollution while at other times created no pollution at all? This
small change alters the result entirely. Here, imposing a costly screen
would still preclude DouglasCo from making highly polluting and
therefore socially costly versions of Baird B, but it would also preclude
the firm from making nonpolluting and therefore socially beneficial
versions of Baird B. Under these conditions, Regulator could no longer
conclude that imposing costly screens on DouglasCo's production of
Bairds would likely be welfare enhancing. If the "good" Baird Bs
outnumbered the "bad" Baird Bs, it would be a mistake to block their
production entirely.
This highly abstracted example illustrates how processes
imposed by government in advance of exercising a given right can
generate social value that is independent of the content of the process
itself. The extended hypothetical we have sketched out here, while
highly abstract, describes two major areas of intellectual property
law-patent and copyright-and lays the foundation for showing how
the processes for vesting each of these rights are best understood as
costly screens. We take up this argument in the sections that follow.

II. COSTLY PATENTS
For patent applicants, the process of patent examination is
costly. The average patent applicant will pay more than $20,000 to
obtain a patent, and that figure can be much higher for patents in
complex technological fields. At the same time, examination does not
reliably weed out the worst patents. Patent examiners have
significant private incentives to grant even invalid patents and little
incentive to block them. Examiners are also able to devote only a short
amount of time to examining each patent. Even the procedural rules
governing patent examinations are stacked against denials.
Consequently, patent attorneys have come to believe that they can
push through nearly any patent application with continuous appeals
18. The costly screen clearly does not create a perfect world where DouglasCo produces
Baird A only when that production is socially beneficial. The screen will permit all production of
Baird A, which by assumption will include some instances in which that production will be
socially costly. We illustrate here only that costly screens can represent Pareto improvements,
not that they necessarily eliminate all social problems.
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and re-filings. These improperly granted patents can exact social
costs, dissuading firms from entering into markets or commercializing
inventions and clogging the processes of innovation.
If patent examination is both expensive and ineffective, why
continue it? In light of these twin failings, scholars have proposed two
types of systemic reforms. Some advocate investing greater resources
in more extensive examination by the PTO. 19 Others, pointing to the
large percentage of patents that are economically insignificant,
suggest scaling back (or even eliminating) the PTO examination
process and moving toward a system of (free) patent registration and
ex post review in the courts, much like copyright. 20 Both groups,
however, treat the expenditures involved in prosecuting a patent
solely as the cost of the active examination that takes place, to be
minimized wherever possible.
In this Part, we present a novel conception of the role that the
PTO process plays in deterring the filing of bad patents. Examination
procedures at the patent office impose private costs on patent
applicants. These procedural costs act as a costly screen, dissuading
putative patent holders from filing for patent rights that they expect
will be worth little-we call them "low private value" patents. Because
of the structure of patent rights, these low private value inventions
will necessarily be harmful, not beneficial, to society at large. That is,
they will have "low social value" as well. 21 Consequently, the PTO's
costly screen will block only harmful patents; it will not deter
innovators from creating genuinely useful inventions. There is thus
reason to believe that patent-examination costs are useful simply
because they select against socially harmful patents while leaving
beneficial ones unscathed.
A. Patent Costs
Stories of ridiculous, invalid, and obvious patents have become
commonplace. 22 In recent years the PTO has gained infamy for
allowing patents on the process of toasting bread, a stick, and a
19. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
21. Importantly, the converse is not true. A patent with low private value will have low
social value, but a patent with low social value will not necessarily have low private value. We
describe and analyze this phenomenon in the Section that follows. See infra Part II.B. This
Section and the next draw and expand upon Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent
Examination,2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
579 (1999) (describing the expanding scope of patentability).
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method for swinging on a swing, to name just a few examples. 23 Far
more importantly, however, the PTO has granted invalid patents on
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of "inventions" in innovative fields
such as software, biotechnology, and electronics. 24 These patents, on
inventions that either would have been obvious to scientists in the
field or were anticipated by prior work, carry with them the potential
to stifle innovation and discourage firms from entering into productive
markets. Even if they are never litigated-indeed, especially if they
are never litigated and are never evaluated in court-these "bad"
patents impose significant costs on consumers and producers in
precisely those industries in which rapid technological progression
and the growth of small-scale market participants are most important.
Patentees will always seek to obtain even invalid patents
because they can be used to collect licensing fees and block
competitors. But these types of patents are allowed to come into
existence only because of the inadequacies and pathologies of the
procedures employed by the patent office to screen them out. Unlike
nearly every other federal agency, the patent office treats the private
parties with
whom it interacts-patent
applicants-as its
"customers," 25 and the office describes its mission as "help[ing] our
26
customers get patents" and "ensur[ing] strong IP for all Americans."
This is not exactly a skeptical stance. Nor is it mere rhetoric. Rather,
this view of the PTO's institutional role manifests itself in the
procedures that the office has created to process applications and the
incentives placed upon the key actors within the system, the patent
examiners.

23. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34 (2004)
(enumerating examples of these worthless and obvious patents).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WORKING FOR OUR
CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW 1 (1994) [hereinafter PTO, WORKING

FOR OUR CUSTOMERS], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pgl.5.pdf
("We at the PTO remain focused on providing effective and efficient patent and trademark
service to our customers."). This is in contrast to other administrative organizations, such as
prosecutors' offices, that structure internal cultures and incentives so as to mitigate the effect of
rational self-interest. Prosecutors themselves have an incentive to dismiss cases or settle them
quickly, for short sentences, in order to dispose of their workload and maximize leisure time.
Prosecutors' offices counter this incentive by creating cultures that value longer sentences and
higher conviction rates and evaluating line prosecutors on those grounds. See Stephanos Bibas,
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-71 (2004)
(discussing prosecutors' personal incentives in managing cases).
26. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE REVIEW 7 (1997), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlannual/1997/; PTO,
WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS, supra note 25.
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Each patent application filed with the PTO is referred to a
single patent examiner, who maintains authority over the application
during nearly its entire life. 2 7 The examiner must decide whether to
grant or reject the patent application. Yet these two activities are not
symmetric. Rejecting a patent application is more difficult and timeconsuming for the examiner than granting one. If the examiner grants
the application, there is little process required-the examiner simply
announces that she is allowing the application to mature into a
patent. If the examiner rejects the patent, however, she must justify
that decision and identify the relevant prior documents and the
section of the Patent Act that has caused her to reject the
28
application.
Patent examiners receive salary bonuses based on the number
of patent applications that they are able to process. 29 This fact, by
itself, might skew the examiner's incentives as granting a patent is
easier than rejecting one. But the problem is in fact far greater.
Unlike a patent grant, an examiner's decision to reject a patent
application does not end the matter. First, the patent examiner cannot
issue a "final" rejection on the first go-around. 30 If the examiner
initially rejects the patent, the applicant is entitled to request a
reexamination in front of the same examiner. 31 After this second
examination, the examiner may choose to issue a "final" rejection of
the application, though she need not do so. 32 (In theory, the examiner
and the applicant could engage in an infinitely iterated series of
preliminary rejections and reexaminations, and indeed many patents
are the subject of three or four office actions before they are finally
accepted or rejected.33 ) Yet even if the examiner issues a final rejection
of an application, the matter is not closed. If the applicant does not
wish to abandon the invention, she may file a continuation

27.

See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:

CASES AND MATERIALS 51-53 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the patent prosecution process).
28. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2011) ("The reasons for any adverse action or any objection or
requirement will be stated in an Office action ... ").
29. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 136 (describing the internal functioning of the PTO).
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(a).
31. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 136 ("But applicants can modify and appeal
patents that are initially rejected .... Thus, a rejected patent will typically consume much more
of an examiner's time than one that is allowed after the initial application.").
32. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(a) ("On the second or any subsequent examination or consideration by
the examiner the rejection or other action may be made final .. ") (emphasis added).
33. This estimate is based upon conversations with patent prosecutors at a number of law
firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with authors.
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application. 34 The patent application remains before the same
examiner as if the "final rejection" had not been genuinely effective,
and the examiner does not receive credit toward her bonus.
Moreover, there is no limit to the number of continuation
applications that an applicant may file. 35 If the applicant is willing to
pay the necessary costs, the examiner has no way of rejecting the
application decisively.
The rational, self-interested examiner thus has a tremendous
incentive to grant the vast majority of patent applications. By
consequence, essentially all observers agree that the substantive
examination of patents at the PTO is of very poor quality. 36 The poor
quality of patent examination is all the more galling in light of its high
cost. An initial patent application on a relatively complex technologya semiconductor or biotechnology patent, for instance-will typically
cost between $11,000 and $15,000 when prepared by a reputable law
firm.3 7 Once PTO fees 38 and other attorneys' costs are figured into the
34. 35 U.S.C. § 120. The applicant can also appeal the decision directly to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), which can overturn the examiner's decision and send
the patent back to the examiner for further consideration. Id. § 134. If the applicant loses before
the BPAI, she then holds the right to appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit. Id. § 141. The
applicant may also bring a civil action in federal district court against the director of the patent
office seeking essentially the same relief, id. § 145, though few choose this route.
35. The PTO recently attempted to impose an administrative limit on continuation
applications, see Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72
Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1), only to see its regulation
struck down by a district court as inconsistent with the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2. Tafas v.
Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807, 817 (E.D. Va. 2008). This decision was on appeal to the Federal
Circuit when the PTO voluntarily agreed to withdraw its new guidelines, mooting the case. See
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds Controversial Patent
Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp.
36. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 142; Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational
Ignorance] (citing examples of complaints about the PTO's examinations); Mark A. Lemley et al.,
What To Do About Bad Patents?,REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 10 [hereinafter Lemley et al.,
Bad Patents] ("[C]ountless patents that seem reasonable to a lay audience overreach in technical
...); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
fields.
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (discussing "[c]alls for patent reform"); Merges, supra
note 22, at 589-91 (discussing the poor quality of patents and proposing a revamping of the
PTO's examination system); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities,51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) ("[T]he PTO struggles to improve examination quality.").
37. Oversight Hearing on the United States Patent and Trademark Office Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan J. Kasper, First Vice President, American Intellectual Property
available at http://www.aipla.org/Advocacy%20Shared%20Documents
Law Association),
/TES_2008-02-27_1OC_PTO-Kasper.pdf, at 7. These figures were confirmed in a number of
independent conversations with attorneys at a variety of law firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis
LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes are on file with the authors.
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equation, an average patentee will spend approximately $22,000 to
successfully prosecute a patent application. 3 9
In response to the inadequacies of the patent office and the
costs of obtaining a patent, scholars have advanced a number of
proposals designed to shore up that failing agency and provide a more
effective screen against non-novel and potentially harmful patents.
Some scholars have recommended increasing PTO funding in order to
enable the office to hire more examiners and spend a greater amount
of time on each patent. 40 Another, smaller cadre has asserted that
patent examinations should be eliminated altogether, with the patent

38. The PTO charges a variety of small fees for prosecuting a patent. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
41(a)(1)(B) (2006) (filing fees); id. § 41(a)(2) (fees for claims); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16(a)(1), 1.16(k),
1.16(o) (2011) (filing, search, and examination fees); id. §§ 1.16(h), 1.16(i) (2011) (fees for claims);
id. § 1.16(j) (fees for claims); id. § 1.18(a) (issuance fees).
39. This figure is based on calculations undertaken by the authors based on a set of
representative patents. Notes are on file with the authors and available upon request. In 2001,
Mark Lemley estimated the average cost at $10,000 to $30,000. Lemley, Rational Ignorance,
supra note 37, at 1498 (performing back-of-the-envelope calculations of patent costs). If anything,
then, the estimate here may be overly conservative.
40. See generally H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23 (proposing
that the patent office expend greater funds on more rigorous examination); John R. Allison &
Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time:
The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan,
What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 1219 (2004); Lemley et al., Bad Patents, supra note 37, at 12-13. See also Patent Reform
Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing greater allocations of funds for patent
examination). Many of these proposals are coupled with suggestions for meaningful inter partes
post-grant administrative review, mechanisms by which potential infringers can challenge a
patent's validity without undertaking expensive litigation in federal courts. See JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 23; Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Lemley, RationalIgnorance, supra note 37.
Some even recommend a multitiered system of patent review in which applicants can opt for
one of several levels of PTO scrutiny with correspondingly strong ex post presumptions of
validity. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23 (proposing an increase in PTO fees as a means
of funding more extensive patent examination); Lemley et al., Bad Patents, supra note 37
(proposing the same); Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes-Proposalsfor
DecreasingCongestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 121 (2005) (proposing the
same). Other commentators have suggested heightened ex post renewal fees as a means of
thinning the patent thicket, see, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable PatentRights,
60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 877-80, but these increased fees would impact only truly abandoned
inventions and would have no measurable effect on patents destined for use in nuisance
lawsuits. And even more exotic proposals abound, including suggestions for tradable patent
rights that will limit the number of patents in force at any given time by compelling patentees to
bid on a finite pool of litigation rights. Id. at 890-93. But see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy
Case for Patent Races Over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2007) (arguing that government is illsuited to determine when patent auctions should be held). These proposals for inter partes or
multitiered review are in many cases quite compelling, and the theory set forth here can serve a
complementary role to any or all of them.
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system reverting to a simple system of registration akin to the
41
copyright regime.
These assessments of the patent system share a common
feature: they treat the cost of obtaining a patent as simply the
purchase price for the substantive patent examination. The costs are
viewed as a necessary evil, worthwhile only to the extent that they
make substantive examination possible. Hence the view that if costs
are high and examination is largely ineffectual, the system should be
reformed. 42 Accordingly, most scholars argue that patent costs should
be no higher than absolutely necessary to facilitate patent
examination-regardless of whether they believe that there should be
more or less rigorous examination in the first place. 43 None of these
approaches considers the possibility that the high cost of prosecuting a
patent might itself have a beneficial effect on the quality of patents
issued.
In fact, the cost of obtaining a patent serves an important
function: it screens out a significant number of harmful intellectual
property rights-patents that would be filed but for that cost. PTO
process costs thus create a screen against lower-value patents. If a
patentee believes that her property right will be worth less than
$22,000 (or so), she will likely refrain from filing in the first place. 44 In
the Section that follows, we explain the significance of this screen for
commercial firms, patent filers, and the patent system as a whole.

41. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for RegisteringPatents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
42. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
43. In addition to the sources cited in notes 40-41, supra, see, e.g., Rochell Dreyfus,
Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2006)
("Indeed, the fee structure should be accomplishing substantive goals: application fees should be
low enough to attract patenting by all inventors and maintenance fees should be high enough to
encourage abandonment of noncommercial patents.").
44. It is possible, of course, that patentees will not have good information regarding the
potential value of their property rights, and that they will file for substantial numbers of patents
that are worth less than $22,000 or refrain from filing for substantial numbers of patents that
are worth more than $22,000. We believe this is unlikely. The vast majority of patentees in the
modern era are major firms doing business in their inventive field. See John R. Allison & Mark
A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2099, 2116 (2000) (finding that eighty-five percent of all patents are assigned to
corporations upon issuance and noting that the average patent lists more than two inventors).
For these types of actors, estimations of commercial value typically precede research and
development decisions: firms will only undertake a line of research if they believe (to some
degree of certainty) that it will be commercially viable. Their knowledge of the marketplacenecessary to the existence of the business in the first instance-allows them to gauge the
potential worth of their property rights.
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B. Low Barriersand Private/PublicAsymmetries
By itself, the fact that patent application processes function as
a costly screen says little about what sorts of patents will be screened
out. It also provides little information regarding whether the screen is
desirable or undesirable. After all, if the costly screen is not
eliminating harmful patents, it serves only to increase transaction
costs for patent filers. Yet there is good reason to believe that PTO
process costs will screen out disproportionately more harmful patents
and thus produce meaningful benefits.
Our objective in this Section is to describe and analyze the
types of patents that will or will not be affected by the PTO's costly
screen. In order to do so, we subdivide the universe of possible patents
into four categories by making two conceptual "cuts." The first step is
to determine exactly which sorts of patents the costly screen will select
against. Accordingly, we divide the universe of patents into "low" and
"high" value types. We define these categories based on the cost of
obtaining a patent: those patents that are worth more than $22,000
are, by definition, "high value" patents, and those that are worth less
than $22,000 are 'low value" patents. 45 It is important to note that
"low" does not necessarily mean "greater than or equal to zero." Under
certain circumstances, a patent can have negative value. 46 We describe
47
these types of patents in the sections that follow.
The next step is to determine whether the patents affected by
the costly screen are "good" or "bad" patents-that is, whether they
are beneficial or harmful to innovation and to society more generally.
In order to do this, we draw a conceptual distinction between the
private value of a patented invention and the public or social value of
that invention. The private value of a patent is what it is worth to the
48
patent holder; the social value is what it is worth to society at large.
45. We do not mean to overstate the accuracy of these types of determinations. For purposes
of the analysis that follows, we describe the operation of the costly screen in terms of orders of
magnitude: the screen will deter applicants who believe their patents to be worth on the order of
$22,000 (i.e., in the tens of thousands of dollars) or less and will not dissuade applicants who
believe they have inventions that are an order of magnitude more valuable (i.e., worth in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars or more). Even this crude distinction permits us to draw
definitive conclusions about the function and consequences of the PTO's costly screen.
46. We also note that it is not entirely accurate to speak of "low value patents"; the entire
point of this conceptual division is that the costly screen will deter applicants from filing for
patents that are worth that little. They are more accurately described as "potential" low value
patents, but we will refer to them as "low value patents" in the interest of simplicity.
47. See infra Parts II.B.2 and 3.
48. Two minor points of clarification. First, to be precise, it is the patent itself (the
intellectual property right) that creates private value by allowing the inventor to capture returns
from the invention, while it is the underlying invention that creates social value. (However, the
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Social and private values can be low or high, per the previous
distinction.
Using these two distinctions, the universe of patents can be
separated into four categories. First, there are patents with both high
private value and high social value. These are valuable, novel
inventions-new drug compounds, innovative computer circuits, etc.that contribute something tangible to society and might not exist but
for the research incentives created by the patent system. They
represent the paradigm case for the patent system. Second, there are
patents with high private value and low or negative social value.
These are minor or insignificant innovations that contribute little to
public knowledge but are nonetheless drafted in such a way that they
can be used to collect significant licensing fees or litigation awards
from profitable companies. 49 Third, there are patents of low private
value and low or negative social value. These are quite common and
come in a variety of shapes and forms; we discuss them in greater
detail below. And fourth, one could imagine patents of low private
value and high social value. Table 1 illustrates these four potential
types of patents graphically.
TABLE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE PATENT TYPES
2. High private
1. High private
value/Low social
value/High social
value
value
4. Low private
value/High social
value

3. Low private
value/Low social
value

In the sections that follow, we describe these four categories of
patents in greater detail and explain their significance in relation to
the PTO's costly screen. Our theory is that patents are not evenly
distributed among these four categories. Instead, there is a
pronounced asymmetry within the universe of potential patents, one

property right can create social costs.) Nonetheless, in the interest of simplicity we will simply
refer to low/high private/social value patents. Second, we will describe the social value of a
patent (its effect on social welfare) directly, not as a sum of some private benefit and some social
cost. We do this for two reasons. First, the private benefit from patent rights typically involves
only wealth transfers, which have no effect on social welfare. And second, it is easier to
understand and evaluate these quantities separately as there is direct information on them.
These moves have no theoretical consequences; we highlight them only for reasons of clarity.
49. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and BargainingBreakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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that causes the costly screen to block primarily harmful, low social
value patents. The PTO's costly screen may succeed in blocking
undesirable patents that, if submitted for examination, might slip
through the cracks of the substantive examination process.
1. High Private Value/High Social Value Patents
When one thinks of a paradigmatic patent, one typically
images a patent that is valuable both to its owners (high private
value) and to the public at large (high social value). These types of
patents come in many forms and occupy many technological fieldsthey might cover useful new drug compounds, innovative
semiconductor devices, or the like. But they share three common
characteristics. First, they must be at least plausibly valid, and thus
plausibly enforceable as property rights. Second, they must claim
inventions (or important components or subparts of inventions) that
are commercially viable and useful in a market economy. Third, the
patent must describe inventions that are genuinely new and thus
contribute some socially valuable knowledge that did not previously
exist. A patent satisfying the first two characteristics is privately
valuable-its owner will be able to extract rents either through
licensing or through production of the patented good. To have social
value-if the invention behind it is to enhance social welfare-the
third characteristic must also be present.
The patent system is designed to promote precisely this type of
high private value/high social value patent. And while the PTO's
costly screen will make these patents slightly more costly to obtain, it
will likely block few or none of them. Twenty-two thousand dollars is a
meaningful amount of money, but it represents little more than a
rounding error in comparison to a truly valuable intellectual property
right. The $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is unlikely to discourage
researchers who believe that their work will lead to useful,
marketable inventions. 50 Thus, while the costs of getting a patent are
50. We hasten to add that under certain circumstances it is possible that small (or solo)
inventors might be subject to capital constraints that would inhibit their ability to obtain a
patent or commercialize an invention. Even a valuable idea could be lost if its holder does not
possess the necessary $22,000 in start-up capital. Nevertheless, it will be the rare inventor who
cannot obtain the financing necessary to prosecute a patent valued in the millions or (in the
alternative) find a willing buyer for the same idea. Twenty-two thousand dollars is a fairly small
amount of money, even for a solo investor. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING
CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE

WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY 17-29 (2003) (arguing, using empirical data, that existing
financial markets provide entrepreneurs with plentiful options for raising capital). It is worth
noting that $22,000 is far less than the typical mortgage and less even than many unsecured
personal loans.
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real, they will not deter any valuable innovations that fall into this
category. There will be no large losses to society because inventions
are not being created.
2. High Private Value/Low Social Value Patents
Although an ideal patent system would not allow patents that
generate revenue for their holders without correspondingly benefitting
society, the current patent system is far from ideal. A patent may have
contributed little or no useful knowledge, but it might nevertheless
cover profitable inventions created by others and thus be valuable to
its owner. 5 1 Patents may be privately valuable because they can be
deployed offensively, with the intention of collecting awards for
infringement or licensing fees;5 2 they may hold value as defensive
mechanisms for protecting commercial products from competition or
from suit for infringement; 53 and they might be usefully employed as
signals to dissuade potential market entrants or attract investors and
other third parties. 54 As a class, these patents have high private value:
they satisfy the first two conditions listed above-plausible validity
and commercial relevance.
At the same time, a patent might hold only small or negative
social value because it involves little or no socially useful innovation.
These patents do not provide the substantial benefits conveyed by the
genuinely useful and novel inventions described above. These are the
types of patents typically wielded by "patent trolls"-those businesses
that contribute no new useful innovative activity but possess a
55
portfolio of patents that they enforce against others.
Like the high private value/high social value patents described
above, the PTO's costly screen will not serve as a meaningful barrier

51. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 18-21 (2008) (describing the power of

invalid patents in collecting rents and interfering with commercialization).
52. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521,
1522-24 (2005). On licensing, see Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving
Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2003).
53. See John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent
Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119,
121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
54. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BuS. L. 137, 144 (2000); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
625, 651-53 (2002).
55. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and
PatentLaw Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009) (describing and analyzing the behavior
of patent trolls).
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to high private value/low social value patents. The $22,000 barrier to
entry is a small fraction of the value to be realized from a patent of
this type. Accordingly, the cost of obtaining a patent is almost beside
the point for inventions such as these. Patent applicants will file for
them despite the cost.
3. Low Private Value/Low Social Value Patents
We now turn to the first class of patents that the PTO's costly
screen will select against: those patents that would have both low
private value (to their owners) and low social value. Here, because the
private value of any individual patent is less than the cost required to
obtain it, patent applicants will frequently elect not to file for these
types of patents. In that sense it is appropriate to think of this
category as containing "potential" patents-patents that would exist
in large numbers but for the costly screen. That is not to say that
there will be no such patents-applicants will sometimes err in
valuing their own inventions, take gambles, or patent for any number
of reasons not involving the prospect of financial gain. 56 But the
number of these patents will be much lower than it would be absent
the PTO's costly screen.
What sorts of patents (and potential patents) fall into the low
private value/low social value category? These patents come in a
variety of forms, but two important flavors predominate. The first are
those patents that comprise the "patent thicket": essentially worthless
patents that are rarely litigated or enforced. The fact that these
patents are rarely used does not mean that they have no economic
significance, however. On the contrary, they drive up search costs and
increase litigation risk for commercial firms that are actually
innovating and manufacturing. 5 7 The very existence of these patents is
enough to raise costs for productive firms, regardless of what the
58
patents' owners do with them.
These types of patents raise costs to productive firms in a
variety of ways. First, any firm that wishes to enter a market must
investigate the IP that exists in that area of technology and determine

56. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15-18) (on file with authors) (cataloging the reasons why
authors and inventors might produce innovations in the absence of financial motivations).
57. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 615-16; Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 40,
at 872-74; Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 132-37 (2006).
58. Leslie, supra note 57, at 137 (analyzing the harm that even unenforced patents can do
to competitors and consumers within the marketplace).
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(at least preliminarily) whether those patents are valid. 59 This
investigation, even if cursory, can be quite expensive. The search costs
of combing through a technological field littered with patents can be
prohibitively high for small firms. 60 Second, invalid patents can
hamper a firm's ability to raise capital 61 or write contracts with
potential customers. 62 Financial markets will be wary of firms that
may be targets for lawsuits because they produce infringing products.
Customers will hesitate before forming business relationships that
may expose them to suits for contributory infringement and resist
relying upon suppliers who may be shut down or driven out of the
market by a lawsuit.6 3 Again, these costs will exist even if no lawsuits
are ever filed. It is the very fact that firms must search through the
thicket of potentially dangerous patents, and the uncertainty that this
creates, that drives up business costs.
The invalid patents that create these costs have very low value
to their owners-they are valuable only to the extent that their
owners wish to keep competitors out of the marketplace. Accordingly,
they diminish social welfare by retarding competition without any
meaningful inventive quid pro quo.
The second major flavor of low private value/low social value
patents-and one that has been comparatively overlooked-is patents
that are useful primarily in nuisance lawsuits. Any patent
infringement suit (or threat of suit) involving even a vaguely plausibly
valid and infringed patent has a nuisance settlement value of
approximately $10,000. The reason is that any patent defendant who
is sued must pay for an opinion letter informing the potential infringer

59. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1344-47 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 40, at 871; Leslie, supra note 57, at
132-37.
60. These search costs are difficult to quantify, and to our knowledge no reliable estimate
exists. But one can easily imagine that the costs could be quite high, particularly when it comes
to products that are potentially covered by hundreds or even thousands of patents, such as
smartphones. See, e.g., Jennifer Collins, Kodak Battles Smartphones over Camera Technology,
MARKETPLACE (June 22, 2011), http://www.marketplace.org/topicslbusiness/kodak-battles.
smartphones-over-camera-technology.
61. See FED. TRADE COMM'N,
COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW

To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
AND POLICY
8 (2003),

THE PROPER BALANCE OF
available at http://www.

ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ('The threat of being sued for infringement by an incumbent
[patent holder]-even on a meritless claim-may 'scare... away' venture capital financing.").
62. Leslie, supranote 57, at 125-27.
63. See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
634, 641 (1950) ("Contributory infringement ... can serve as an effective side-attack to cut off
the economic support of a small producer.").
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of the strength of the patent holder's case 64 and guarding against later
claims of willful infringement 6 5-and the cost of such a letter is
approximately $10,000.66 Substantial numbers of these actions are
initiated by solo inventors or patent holding companies with no
commercial ventures beyond the exploitation of its IP portfolio.
Costs will rise for productive firms if they are forced to pay
small licensing fees or settlements to a series of patent holders who
file nuisance lawsuits.6 7 Firms that face the prospect of being nickeland-dimed by the owners of dubious patents may well choose to
refrain from investing in new technologies or entering new markets in
the first place.6 8 In addition, the nuisance lawsuits themselves can
produce significant deadweight losses; litigants spend thousands of
dollars in transaction costs to prosecute and settle nuisance lawsuits
worth $20,000 or less. Accordingly, substantial quantities of even
plainly invalid patents can impose significant social costs through
sheer force of numbers.
The patents that comprise the "thicket" and those that give rise
to nuisance lawsuits represent intellectual property at its very worst.

64. This is standard practice within the field. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note
36, at 1513.
65. The patent statute allows courts to assess treble damage penalties against willful
infringers. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("[Ihe court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed."); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(setting forth the modern standard for determining when infringement has been willful); see, e.g.,
Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining
that an opinion letter provides near-impenetrable defense to charges of willful infringement);
Nickson Indus. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the same). An
accused infringer has no affirmative duty to seek an opinion letter if it wishes to avoid liability
for willful infringement, Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, but the chances of a finding of willful
infringement increase dramatically when an infringer has not obtained an opinion letter and so
nearly any colorable accusation will trigger a request for the opinion of counsel.
66. These estimates are based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of law firms,
principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP (notes on file with author). The cost of
such a letter can be much higher-in the range of $30,000-if the technology involved is complex
or the asserted patents are sufficiently numerous.
67. Leslie, supra note 57, at 133 (describing the economics of patent nuisance lawsuits).
68. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003) (analyzing the prospective effects that
threats of nuisance lawsuits can have on firm behavior); see also Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp.,
139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.) (describing a patent as a "scarecrow" that can deter
competition by its very existence). But see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261,
265 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage
competitors from making the patented product or using the patented process, and so will not
confer monopoly power ....
). Judge Posner may be correct that a patent must be of at least
"colorable" validity in order for it to be used as a means of exerting monopoly power, but see
Leslie, supra note 57, at 133, but his analysis does not speak to the possibility that the
asymmetric transaction costs involved in patent litigation will enable the holder of a plainly
invalid patent to extract small payouts from market entrants.
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They do little more than drive up transaction costs for firms that
genuinely want to innovate and bring products to markets. Happily,
then, the PTO's costly screen will block these sorts of patents in
substantial numbers. The upfront costs of obtaining a patent deter
potential filers from seeking many of these useless patents that would
otherwise wind up in the thicket. And because it costs more to acquire
a patent than can be extracted in one or two nuisance settlements,
patents become substantially less attractive as business tools and less
69
open to exploitation.
Moreover, the costly screen is even costlier, and thus more
effective, against these types of patents. There are two reasons for
this. First, many of the more insidious patents described here hold
only low private value because they are not plausibly valid.7 0 All else
being equal, it is more expensive to force a questionable patent
through the PTO than a clearly valid one. Patents of suspect validity
are more likely to be rejected initially by the patent examiner, forcing
the applicant to pay additional attorneys' fees and administrative
expenses in order to resubmit the application. 7 1 Second, the patent
thicket is most harmful in heavily congested technical fields, where
large numbers of related patents drive up search costs. 72 But the more
patents that exist within a given field, the more likely that a patent
examiner considering a new application will find prior art casting
doubt on whether the invention is novel (and thus patentable). 73 In
69. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 523-24 (1997)
(analyzing the nuisance lawsuit as a business tactic). This is not to say that nuisance lawsuits
will never be profitable or that firms will never pursue questionable patents with the intent only
to extract such settlements. A firm may be able to garner more than one quick payout with each
patent, though at the same time it will not necessarily be capable of coercing targets-especially
repeat players-into paying even inexpensive blackmail. Because of the costs of obtaining a
patent, a firm cannot count on being able to turn a profit, or even recoup its investment, by
threatening some number of small, meritless suits; it must actually believe that it has an
invention worth commercializing or a valid patent in a commercially useful field before a patent
application becomes worth the cost of prosecution.
70. Some patents will hold small private value because they are commercially
insignificant-a patent on a method for swinging on a swing, for instance-but these patents are
typically irrelevant from an economic or social perspective as well. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra
note 23, at 32 (describing a variety of commercially irrelevant inventions that have nonetheless
led to patents).
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of
crowded property rights on economic development); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698
(1998) (applying the same idea to innovation).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Examiners have better access to patents than they do to
prior art in any other form. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 145-49 (describing the process of
patent examination).
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addition, repeated continuations and re-filings-which become
necessary if a patent is initially rejected-will delay a patent's
issuance, eating into the twenty-year term that begins to run on the
day a patent application is filed. 74 Consequently, transaction costs of
all types will be higher for inventors who attempt to push through
questionable patents, or who attempt to patent inventions in heavily
commercialized fields in which those patents might do the most
75
harm.
In effect, then, the very administrative processes that allow
patentees to "wear down" examiners simultaneously increase the
barriers against the least desirable patents. If the patent system is
crudely successful at screening for invalid or damaging patents, it is
not only (or primarily) because examiners are actually denying those
patents. Rather, the process costs involved in applying for a patent
may be playing just as large a role.
Again, of course, the PTO's costly screen will hardly bar all of
these low private value/low social value patents; tens of thousands of
such applications are filed yearly (and many of them are granted
eventually). 76 Yet without a costly screen-if, for instance, the PTO
were to move to a registration system 77-the problem would likely be
far worse. By selecting against this class of patents, the costly screen
performs a beneficial function. Indeed, the costly screen may be more
effective at eliminating harmful low private value/low social value
patents than the substantive examination that the process costs are
themselves used to purchase.
4. Low Private Value/High Social Value Patents
The previous Section detailed the benefits that the PTO's costly
screen provides by weeding out low private value/low social value
patents. However, these benefits would be quickly outweighed if the
costly screen were similarly deterring inventors from creating (and
filing for) low private value/high social value inventions. That is,
imagine that an inventor has the opportunity to create an invention of
high social value but would only have the incentive to do so if she

74. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
75. The semiconductor and computer fields are typically understood to be heavily patented,
while the pharmaceutical industry is generally thought to involve fewer overlapping property
rights. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 59-60; Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About
Patent Holdup of Standards(and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007).
76. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 36, at 1528 (providing statistics on the rates
of patent grants).
77. E.g., Kieff, supra note 41, at 59; Mossoff, supra note 41.
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could obtain a patent on that invention. Imagine further that the
patent would hold only low private value. If the costly screen
dissuaded inventors from obtaining patents on these inventions, and if
the inability to obtain patents dissuaded inventors from innovating in
the first place, the loss to society might be significant.
But there is a crucial asymmetry within the universe of
potential patents: low private value/high social value patents
essentially do not exist. With very few exceptions, any truly novel,
commercially relevant invention-that is, any socially productive
invention-will give rise to a privately valuable patent on that
invention. 78 This is precisely the point of the patent system: patents
allow inventors to capture a substantial portion of the wealth created
by their inventions.
Importantly, then, the PTO's costly screen will not stand in the
way of any high social value inventions. Any such invention would
also hold high private value for its owner, and thus it would be worth
inventing (and patenting) despite the screen. It is in this sense that
the asymmetry in patent law, driven by the strength of the patent
right, makes the PTO's examination-based costly screen valuable. The
screen does not deter genuine innovation, but it does block large
numbers of low private value/low social value patents that create
social costs for productive and innovative firms.
Now, to say that the category of low private value/high social
value patents is empty is to invite counterexamples. But even
inventions that might appear at first glance to fall into this category
are not truly low private value/high social value in the sense meant
here. Or, put another way, the PTO's costly screen will have no effect
on whether they will or will not be developed. Consider, for instance,
"orphan" drugs-pharmaceutical inventions for which patent
protection has expired (or nearly so). 79 Orphan drugs are low private
value/high social value inventions in the most literal sense: these
drugs would be valuable to society if manufactured and distributed,
but no firm can make a great enough profit from them to render their
development commercially worthwhile.8 0 As a result, they languish.
Yet this has nothing to do with the cost of obtaining a patent on the
drugs. These drugs are unprofitable because the costs of obtaining
78. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 7-8 (describing the usefulness of patents as legal
tools for capturing value from innovation).
79. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 386-87 (2010)
(discussing orphaned drugs).
80. See Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugs and the Standards of Patentability,87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 551-55 (2009) (discussing the financial incentives that lead to the problem of orphan
drugs).
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Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval are so high-in the
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, once the FDA has
approved the drug, any company can manufacture and sell it.81 Other
firms can then free ride off of the first FDA approval without incurring
the same costs, competing away the first firm's profits.8 2 This is what
turns drugs into "orphans"; the $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is
simply irrelevant to the calculation.
Or consider the large number of valuable patents that are
given over to the public for one reason or another. This category
includes patents on standardized interfaces;8 3 patents that are
deliberately pooled and made publicly available;8 4 and patents that
have been obtained in the course of a government contract and must
be licensed at zero cost to the government.8 5 At first glance, these
patents might appear to have high social value but low private value.
After all, their owners are bestowing them freely upon the public. But
this appearance is misleading. These types of property rights most
certainly do have high private value; it just happens that the
particular owners who have come into possession of them have chosen
to relinquish them, rather than exploit them. This is often because the
private owner stands to reap greater benefits from renouncing the
patent than from attempting to enforce it.86 If the patent were owned
by another firm with a different business model, the outcome would
undoubtedly be very different.8 7 Moreover, as we explained above, the
creation of the intellectual property right is quite beside the point-it
is the underlying technology that matters to society. Inventors are
obviously undertaking this research and development even though

81. Id. at 522.
82. Id.
83. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2009) (describing the problems that can arise when these patents are not
transferred to the public domain).
84. See generally Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law

and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (2007) (discussing the role of patent pools as a tool to enhance
efficiency and spur innovation).
85. See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828, 834 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he
government requires defense contractors to give it title or a license in any patents conceived or
reduced to practice during the course of performance of government contracts."). We thank Pam
Samuelson for drawing this category of patents to our attention.
86. In the case of the government contractor, for instance, the contractor would
undoubtedly prefer to retain the patent right. However, the government contract is more
valuable than the property right-and that government contract is undoubtedly worth more than
$22,000.
87. We return to this point about nonpecuniary motivations in Part flI.C.1, infra.
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they plan to transfer the intellectual property rights to the public.8 8
The PTO's costly screen thus poses no threat to this type of
innovation.
Finally, it is possible that patents function as lottery tickets: an
inventor might file for large numbers of patents, hoping (but not
knowing) that one will become valuable. Ex ante, each individual
patent might therefore be worth little to the inventor.8 9 On this
theory, the costly screen could conceivably deter the filing of some of
these lottery tickets.
We have doubts as to this lottery ticket theory, however. At
first glance, the theory does not seem to do justice to inventors and
patent holders, at least on the valuation scales relevant here. As we
noted earlier, the vast majority of patentees in the modern era are
major firms doing business in their inventive field. 90 Their knowledge
of the marketplace will likely allow them to make judgments far more
accurate than the idea of "lottery tickets" would suggest. And again,
these valuations need not even be terribly fine-grained; the question is
whether the patent is worth only tens of thousands of dollars or
substantially more.
But even if the notion of patents as lottery tickets is an
accurate representation of reality, it is not clear that the patent
system should accommodate it. Massive quantities of low value
patents impose significant negative externalities upon other firms
seeking to do business in the same markets. 91 The PTO's costly screen
would force inventors to invest additional resources in acquiring
information about the expected value of their inventions. This would
cause them to be more circumspect in selecting which patents to fileprecisely the outcome that would be most beneficial to society. 92

88. Among other things, it is not necessary to obtain a patent in order to ensure that a
technology remains in the public domain. Proof of first inventorship or dissemination of the
technology to the public will do the trick. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (2006).
89. The idea is related, though not identical, to "patent portfolio theory," developed by
Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner, which embodies the idea that in many industries
patents are more valuable in groups than they are singly. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005). Patent portfolio theory is entirely
consistent with the ideas we propound here. If a multitude of patents collectively hold some
significant value, each individual patent may be worth a comparably modest amount.
90. Allison & Lemley, supranote 44, at 2117.
91. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text (describing costs related to low private
value/low social value patents).
92. This will prove impossible only when patent filing must necessarily precede systematic
investigation of the invention's commercial worth, most notably (and perhaps only) as with
patents on new pharmaceutical compounds, which are filed before FDA trials on those drugs
begin. See generally Roin, supra note 80, at 523-28. There, whatever effect the PTO's costly
screen may be having, it is far from debilitating; the pharmaceutical industry is "thought to be
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The preceding examples should provide some indication as to
what it means for a patent to have low private value and high social
value, and why such patents essentially do not exist. In the end, of
course, there could be minor exceptions to the rule. Inventions may
fall through the cracks or their value may not become apparent when
they are created. One could imagine a transformative idea that does
not directly give rise to an "invention"93 or a peculiar invention that
creates wealth that somehow cannot be captured commercially. But
these patents will be the rare outliers. Unlike the other three
categories of patents, there is no true class of low private value/high
social value patents. The asymmetry may not be absolute, but it is
undoubtedly significant. And the theory here does not depend on this
category of patents being entirely nonexistent; as long as there is a
meaningful
asymmetry,
the
PTO's
costly
screen
will
disproportionately select against patents that are socially harmful.

Table 2 summarizes this set of relationships between private
and social value for various types of patents. Only patents of low
private value and low or negative social value-precisely those patents
most likely to diminish social welfare-will be meaningfully affected
by the cost of PTO procedures. Accordingly, the costly screen
established by patent procedures will act only against low social value
patents-precisely the type of intellectual property right that the
patent system should be weeding out.

the patent system's greatest success story." Id. at 504; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720-21 (2005) ("Patent law
traditionally takes the lion's share of credit for motivating investments in drug development.").
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ...").
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TABLE 2: SOCIAL AND PRIVATE VALUES OF
VARIOUS PATENT CLASSES
High social value
High
private
value

Commercial
products;
improvements;
major components

Low
private
value

Essentially none

Low or negative
social value
Blocking patents;
valid patents
involving little novel
research
Nuisance patents;
minor inventions

It remains impossible to know for certain whether the process
costs involved with patent examination are justified in the aggregate.
After all, every applicant, including those with valid patents and
useful inventions, is forced to expend significant resources to obtain a
patent. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that the costly
screen imposed by PTO examination, coupled with the substantive
examination purchased by those costs, serves as a productive filter
against welfare-diminishing patents without deterring any truly
socially productive inventions.
III. COSTLY COPYRIGHTS
Copyrights, like patents, vest in both highly lucrative and
popular works as well as in trivial and worthless ones, albeit for very
different reasons. In contrast to patents, law allows copyrights to arise
with relative ease. Instead of navigating an extensive examination
process, authors need only fix their work in a tangible medium in
order for federal copyright to vest. The costlessness with which
copyrights arise has led to an unchecked increase in copyrighted
works of authorship, accompanied by a critical scholarship arguing
that this increase is socially harmful and that it should be cabined by
the imposition of various screening devices. Analyzing copyrights
through the lens of costly screens illustrates why such suggestions
may diminish, rather than enhance, social welfare. Because copyrights
array differently across classes of value than patents, imposition of
costly screens would preclude the production of a crucial category of
works (low private value/high social value) while eliminating a class of
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works that is largely innocuous (low private value/low social value)
and would be detrimental to social welfare.
A. Copyright Costs
The vesting of federal copyrights costs authors almost nothing.
Once an author fixes an original work of authorship in a tangible
medium of expression, they own the copyright in that work without
further ado. 94 Acquiring a copyright is not entirely costless. Vesting
requires fixation in a tangible medium of expression, but this is
usually effectively costless since fixation occurs coterminously with
creation, as where an author types a novel on a laptop computer or
paints a portrait on canvas. There are some instances where creation
may take place in the absence of fixation, such as where the authors of
sound recordings must record their works to perfect their rights, so
that, in these cases, fixation will add some cost prior to vesting. Still,
the costs of fixing a work are, on average, so low that we can treat
95
them as negligible for the purpose of our analysis.
The essential screenlessness of the federal copyright system
has caused copyrights to become ever more numerous, and many
authors have expressed reservations about this trend. A primary
concern resides in the uncertainty created by the numerosity of
copyrights. Some have argued that, in a world where any minimally
original and fixed work is likely the subject of copyright protection, the
odds that future work will infringe some preexisting right multiplies,
deterring risk-averse authors from creation. 96 In a related vein, others
have suggested that copyright's low vesting threshold leads to
prohibitively high transaction costs because owners are so numerous
that even if their rights are ascertainable, creators may be unable (for

94. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
95. Formalities exist in other areas of copyright law. For example, in order to bring a
copyright infringement suit in federal court, an owner's work must be registered with the
Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411. Registration also secures other advantages for prevailing
parties, including the option of recovering statutory damages, attorney's fees, and court costs. Id.
§ 412. Because registration is not related to the initial vesting of a copyright, and indeed can only
occur once vesting has taken place, it is not a formality that is relevant to our analysis.
96. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 183-207 (2004) (discussing this information
costs concern about the expansion of copyright); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2007) ("Intellectual property's
road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because liability is difficult to predict and the
consequences of infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license
when none is needed.").
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pecuniary or practical reasons) to acquire the licenses necessary to
clear the rights associated with making future work.97
One proposed response to this concern has been to raise the
process costs associated with copyright in order to limit the number of
copyrights awarded. 98 One such proposal suggests the reintroduction
of formalities that were formerly prerequisites for copyright vesting.
Prior to the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 (" '76 Act"),
registration with proper notice was necessary for U.S. copyrights to
arise.9 9 When the '76 Act became effective, the "fixation in a tangible
medium of expression" standard supplanted the preexisting
requirements for perfecting copyrights, resulting in a much lower
vesting threshold. In recent years, writers have floated various
proposals for increasing vesting costs as a way of liming copyrights.
Jim Gibson, for example, has called for a straightforward return to a
pre-1976 Act formalities regime, arguing for the reintroduction of
notice and publication as copyright vesting prerequisites in order to
cut down on the accretion of owners' rights. 100 A different but related
proposal suggested by Larry Lessig, the Public Domain Enhancement
Act, would require owners to pay $1 to renew their copyrights
following the fiftieth year of protection. 10 1 Chris Sprigman has also
suggested a scheme by which compliance with a registration system
would be a prerequisite to the stronger, property-rule protections of

97. See, e.g., James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 16873 (2005) (arguing that the low copyright vesting threshold threatens to restrict creativity,
particularly in digital settings); Van Houweling, supra note 8 (discussing this transaction costs
concern about the expansion of copyright); see also, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi,
Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary
Filmmakers, CENTER FOR SOC. MEDIA 7-22 (2004), available at http://centerforsocialmedia

.org/sites/defaultffilesIUNTOLDSTORIESReport.pdf (enumerating examples of documentary
films that have had difficulty being made due to rights-clearance concerns).
98. For a good overview of the U.S. experience with formalities, see Jane Ginsburg, The
U.S. Experience with Formalities:A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (1909 Act).
100. E.g., Gibson, supra note 96, at 947-50 (encouraging the reintroduction of traditional
formalities to limit the expansion of copyright); see also Ginsburg, supra note 98 (advancing a
qualified defense of formalities in copyright); Stef van Gompel, Formalitiesin the Digital Era:An
Obstacle or Opportunity? 3 (proceedings of the ALAI Annual Congress, London, England, June
14-17, 2009), availableat http://www.alai2009.org(Presentations/Van%2OGompel%2OFormalities
%20in%20the%2Odigital%20era.doc (arguing that reintroduction of formalities will facilitate
copyright clearance and enhance certainty about owners' rights in digital media).
101. The Public Domain Enhancement Act was proposed in the House of Representatives in
both 2003 and 2005, but died in committee each time. See H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.
2408, 109th Cong. (2005); see also LESSIG, supra note 96, at 248-56 (discussing early versions of
the PDEA and the problems it faced gaining traction in Congress).
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the Copyright Act. 10 2 Though very different, these proposals illustrate
the push toward increasing process costs among writers concerned
03
about excess copyright.
In this Part, we raise questions about this literature, at least
insofar as it suggests that raising the costs of initially acquiring a
copyright is an unalloyed good. Using costly screen theory, we
illuminate a typically overlooked reason that the proliferation of
copyrights may not be as socially harmful as is generally believed. We
argue that just as costly screen theory helps to explain the logic of
patent's costly examination system, so can it help to explain why
copyright lacks any meaningful hurdles to the creation of authors'
exclusive rights. Because the Copyright Act confers on owners a much
weaker property entitlement than the Patent Act does, copyrights
array across classes of value differently than patents. This asymmetry
means that costly screens would be as counterproductive in the
copyright setting as they would be beneficial in the patent setting.
That copyrights arise without any process costs creates a
challenge for analyzing the current system in terms of costly screens.
With patents, our analytical approach was straightforward. We
established the costs of patent examination, and used that figure as
the line dividing high private value patents from low private value
patents. Thinking about copyright in terms of costly screens, by
contrast, requires a counterfactual thought experiment. We must
imagine a cost threshold for copyright vesting, and then examine the
implication of that threshold on the creation of works of authorship.
For the sake of symmetry and ease of exposition, we posit a world in
which getting a copyright is as difficult as getting a patent. In such a
world, authors would have to submit their work to an expensive and
onerous examination process, and exclusive rights would not vest until
after the Copyright Office approved authors' applications. This
possible alternative would make copyright vesting just as costly as
acquiring a valid patent-about $22,000.104
102. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004)
(suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for property-rule enforcement of copyright
infringement).
103. Any such proposal may have implementation problems because the United States'
international obligations under the Berne Convention limit its ability to make copyright vesting
contingent on formalities. Since we mention these proposals only to give a sense of the contours
of the present copyright literature, we need not address these concerns.
104. This is by no means the only possible option. One can imagine a trademark-like system
for vesting copyright that would involve some consideration of a copyright's validity and
compliance with formalities, though far less than patent examination entails. Such a system
would charge authors the same amount that trademark registrants currently bear, or roughly
one thousand dollars. Or one can imagine a system that keeps the current copyright registration
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B. Copyright Screens and Public/PrivateAsymmetries
Our next move is to imagine how such a screen would affect the
production of works of authorship. As with patents, we can imagine
two axes along which the value of copyright can be arrayed: the
private value generated for the owner and the social value generated
for the public. Examples of the private value generated by copyright
abound. An author's ability to earn royalties from book or album sales,
or a movie studio's capacity to recover revenues from ticket sales to a
feature film are largely dependent on the owners having exclusive
rights in those works. Works of authorship are typically nonrivalrous
and nonexcludable, and, in the absence of legally enforceable exclusive
rights, owners would have no recourse to uncompensated consumption
of them. It is thus copyright (the exclusive legal entitlement, as
distinguished from the protected work) that enables authors to profit
from their works, 10 5 and in so doing generates private value for those
authors. The distinction between the author's copyright in the work
and the work itself is important. Customers buy books or .mp3s and
audiences queue up for movies because they want to see the work

regime but makes it a prerequisite to vesting rather than to judicial enforcement of infringement
actions. This approach would charge authors the current copyright-registration fee, about one
hundred dollars, to vest their rights. While it may be interesting to examine the implications of
these systems on copyright vesting, we have opted to use the higher threshold in our thought
experiment because this Article is about costly screens, and the implications of much lower-cost
alternatives are simply outside its scope.
105. Copyright is not the exclusive means by which authors earn profits from their work.
Contract may furnish a plausible alternative to copyright in some instances. E.g., William Fisher
III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1250 (1998) (discussing
the potential of contract to supplement, and in some cases supplant, copyright as a means for
enabling authors to extract value from their works). But as the Supreme Court has emphasized,
copyright remains the dominant means by which authors extract value from their creations. See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("[The Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.").
Related, copyright is not always necessary for the production of creative works. Some authors
may create because they are driven by some other force-desire for literary fame, or simply
artistic inspiration-that is unrelated to profit. Moreover, some works-such as computer
programs-may be difficult enough to copy that authors can reap sufficient rewards in the gap
between first creation and first copy to provide a sufficient incentive to create. See, e.g., Michele
Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation, 55 J. MONETARY ECON. 453 (2008).
Our thesis thus operates only with respect to works that are produced primarily in response to
financial incentives. But because these incentives are the core driver of the copyright system, see
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (observing that the "economic philosophy" of the
Copyright Clause is to "advance public welfare" by "encourag[ing] individual effort" through
"personal gain"), this limitation does not diminish the force of our argument.
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itself, regardless of whether it is copyrighted. 10 6 It is thus the work
that directly generates social value, but the copyright in that work
that generates private value.
Social value is harder to quantify in terms of dollars, but, as in
our patent discussion, we define it simply as the net effect (positive or
negative) that copyright has on aggregate welfare. As with private
value, examples of the social benefits generated by creative work are
familiar. Works of authorship generate aesthetic value, as where a
landscape painting causes viewers to experience the beauty of the
scene portrayed by the artist. They may also create informational
value, as where a cookbook educates users and enables them to make
new dishes by following specific instructions. A creative work may also
enrich viewers more generally, as where a groundbreaking fictional
novel causes readers to think about the world around them, or the
craft of writing, in a new way. These forms of social value derive
directly from works of authorship themselves and do not require the
existence of copyright. Nevertheless, copyright indirectly creates social
value by incentivizing the creation of socially valuable works, at least
to the extent that such works may not be created but for the
10 7
protections afforded owners by exclusive rights.
Before we consider the impact of costly screens on the
production of works of authorship, we pause to describe how
copyrights array across classes of value. As with patents, copyright
can produce high or low private value, as well as high or low social
value. Our hypothetical copyright-vesting screen constructs the
high/low private value barrier. Authors will likely create works that
will generate more than the cost of the screen ($22,000), but will not
create any works that generate less than that amount. The idea of
"low" social value includes possible instances where copyrights create
negative social value. The social and private value axes combine to
generate four categories. First are high private value/high social value
copyrights. These are copyrights that create significant revenue
streams for their owner while also contributing knowledge,
information, or entertainment to the public (e.g., popular films, bestselling novels). The second category describes copyrights with high
private value and low social value, though we believe that such
copyrights are vanishingly rare. Third, there are copyrights of low
106. That consumers are copyright-indifferent is obvious. Countless readers enjoy Moby-Dick

and John Grisham books every year, even though the latter are copyrighted while the former is
in the public domain.
107. For this reason, we refer throughout this Section to "high (or low) social value
copyrights," although the social value is directly generated by the protected work and not by the
property right that attaches to that work.
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private value and low social value. We consider at length this category
and the argument that costly screens are attractive because they
eliminate such copyrights. Finally, some copyrights generate high
social value even though they create low private value. We discuss
this quadrant in detail as well, discussing the social costs associated
with limiting it. Table 3 illustrates these four potential types of
copyrights graphically.
TABLE 3: FOUR POSSIBLE COPYRIGHT TYPES
1. High private
2. High private
value/
value/
High social value
Low social value
4. Low private value/
High social value

3. Low private value/
Low social value

In the following four subparts, we analyze each of these
categories of copyrights in more detail. We begin by describing the
types of copyrights that populate each quadrant. We then consider
how imposing a costly, patent-like screen would affect the production
of copyrightable works in each category, and explain how this thought
experiment reveals that the current, screenless copyright vesting
system is deceptively socially beneficial.
1. High Private Value/High Social Value Copyrights
In the first quadrant lie copyrights that create high value for
both their owner and for the public. This is the ideal utilitarian
bargain suggested by copyright's constitutional source of law 0 8 : an
author creates a work, the public consumes that work, and the owner
leverages her exclusive rights to earn income from that consumption.
Copyright's value equation is often more complicated than this
account lets on, but frequently matters do unfold in this standard way.
To take just one example, George Lucas's popular Star Wars films
generated enormous private value for their producer, but they also
enriched the public, either straightforwardly through the aesthetic
experience of seeing the film, or less directly through the generation of
cultural touchstones, shared catch-phrases, and timeless motifs. This

108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....").
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is not to say that the private and social value created by Star Wars are
equivalent. Rather, the latter must be greater than the former. While
George Lucas gets a cut whenever a licensee sells a Star Wars product
or fans buy a Return of the Jedi DVD, much of the value of the beloved
sci-fi franchise comes in the form of positive externalities that Lucas
cannot internalize. 10 9 Moreover, the benefit to an individual from
seeing the film must be greater than the cost of a ticket. These
additional benefits above and beyond what members of the public
must pay constitute social value.
Here, the case for copyright is least uneasy. 110 As we have
explained above, in the absence of exclusive rights that allow owners
to internalize value from their works, creators of even very promising
works would likely not make them at all, depriving themselves-and
the world-of their value. Copyright is, in other words, a necessary
prerequisite for the production of high private value/high social value
works. For this reason, the production of such works would be
unaffected by high process costs. Twenty-two thousand dollars to
secure exclusive rights in the Star Wars franchise is laughably trivial
compared to the billions that Lucasfilm has garnered thanks to those
rights. Charging this much for a copyright would not deter an author
who believed that her film, book, or song had the potential for major
commercial success.
2. High Private Value/Low Social Value Copyrights
The second category encompasses copyrights that create
significant value for their owner, but have low value for the public.
There are many of these patents, such as blocking patents that allow
owners to extract substantial value through holdups while creating no
correlative benefits for society. By contrast, this quadrant contains
no-or vanishingly few-copyrights. The very different way in which
copyright law enables owners to extract value from their works of
authorship makes it unlikely that a work of authorship that generates
little or no value for the public will lead to a copyright that proves
remunerative for its owner.
109. Jon Stewart didn't have to pay Lucas for making Stewart's mockery of Dick Cheney
even more effective by using Darth Vader comparisons, and we don't have to pay Lucas for the
humor value of invoking familiar catchphrases in every day conversation (e.g., 'These aren't the
droids you're looking for" or 'Many Bothans died to bring us this information"). See generally
Brett Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing how
copyright generates positive externalities).
110. Cf. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies,and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281, 283 (1970) (expressing doubt that
economic incentives actually do increase the production of works of authorship).

20121

COSTLY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

713

Two reasons illuminate why this quadrant of the value grid lies
largely empty. First, the Patent and Copyright Acts create property
rights of very different scopes. Patent rights are significantly broader
than the entitlements enjoyed by copyright owners. The Patent Act
extends to owners exclusive rights preventing anyone else from
practicing the patentee's invention or its equivalents.'11 It is thus very
difficult to engineer around a well-drafted patent, and patent holders
can accordingly reap extensive rewards from commercial products that
embody the ideas behind their inventions. 112 Copyright owners, by
contrast, do not enjoy this kind of general prerogative to preclude
others from using their work. Instead, they have only six narrowly
contoured statutory exclusive rights. 113 The scope of copyrights is
further cabined at the front end by the idea/expression dichotomy. A
copyright owner exercises rights over only the specific expression that
is embodied by the author's work, not to the general ideas that
animate it.114 It is narrowed again at the back end by various
statutory defenses, such as fair use 1 5 and § 110's rabbit warren of
rights limitations," 6 all of which add up to permit unauthorized use
under many circumstances. The exclusive rights extended by
copyright simply do not allow authors to internalize anything close to
the full social value that their work actually generates. As a result, a
work that creates little social value will have a copyright that almost
certainly generates little (or no) private value for its author.
The relative narrowness of copyright owners' exclusive rights
points to a second, related reason that the field of high private
value/low social value copyrights remains unpopulated: copyrights are
much easier to engineer around than patents. First, consider the

111. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention . .. infringes the patent."); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (setting the standard for the patent doctrine of equivalents).
112. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 781-923 (describing patent
infringement doctrines and explaining their breadth and strength).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners); see
Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337-38 (2002) ("The copyright
statute doesn't give copyright owners the exclusive right to use their works for limited times, or
the exclusive right to exploit their works commercially for limited times. Instead, it gives
copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute to the public and publicly
perform or display their works, subject to a host of statutory exceptions.") (emphasis added).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding ideas from copyright protection). The Patent Act, by
contrast, allows patentees to prevent others from using the ideas that animate their invention
for the entire twenty-year exclusive rights period. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
116. Id. § 110(5)(B) (permitting public performance of nondramatic musical works by
transmission or retransmission in commercial establishments meeting certain size and
technology requirements).
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idea/expression dichotomy, which limits the subject matter of
copyright owners' exclusive rights. Imagine that someone wishes to
write his own novel about the misadventures of a misfit young
magician, hoping to capitalize on the popularity of the Harry Potter
franchise. Such an effort blatantly seeks to free ride off of J.K.
Rowling's creativity and success, but, as long as the second book does
not copy any of the specific protectable expression (e.g., particular
textual passages, sufficiently well-developed characters) in the Harry
Potter books, none of Rowling's rights have been violated. 117 Second,
copyright's originality requirement creates a safe harbor for authors
who inadvertently create infringing works.1 18 The independent
creation defense allows creators of works identical to preexisting ones
a full defense if the second author can show that they created their
work without actually copying the first one. 1 9 By contrast, patent's
infringement doctrine allows patentees to enjoin all works that
practice the invention-even if the purported infringement in no way
derived from or was influenced by the original.120
Some critics have suggested that the category of high private
value/low social value copyrights is more populous than we claim. One
version of this argument invokes the numerous instances in which
owners have leveraged their copyright so that future actors were
deterred from engaging in creative activity (consider, for example,
owners of sound recordings who insist that hip-hop artists get a
license in order to sample their works 2 ). That such interactions take
place is unsurprising; copyright is, after all, the legally enforceable
117. Rowling might well sue anyway, though, if her reaction to an unauthorized Harry
Potter lexicon is any indication. There, a federal court concluded that the creation of an
annotated guide to the Potter series was actionable because it took actual expression from
Rowling's books. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 534-38 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). And,for what it's worth, Rowling herself is the defendant in a suit alleging that she copied
her Harry Potter character from an earlier book called 'Willy the Wizard." Ryan Kisiel, J.K
Rowling Sued for £500 Million in Plagiarism Lawsuit by Family of Late Willy the Wizard
Author, MAIL ONLINE, June 16, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1193283/JKRowling-sued-500m-plagiarism-lawsuit-family-late-Willy-The-Wizard-author.html.
118. That is, an author who originally creates a work of authorship that happens to be
identical to an earlier one is regarded as not infringing at all. This does not mean that an author
who appropriates protected work without consciousness of the infringement enjoys any defense.
The latter remains actionable, and in that sense copyright infringement remains a strict liability
offense.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring that works of authorship be "original" to merit copyright
protection); see Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting
in part) (noting "the fundamental principle of copyright law that independent creation is never
infringement").
120. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
121. E.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Get
a license or do not sample.").
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right to preclude others from free riding off the fruits of your creative
labor. But few of these instances involve an owner leveraging a low
social value copyright to do so. Popular sound recording catalogs, for
122
If
example, do not involve low social value copyrights at all.
anything, just the opposite is typically the case. That a musician has
chosen to sample another's work proves that the sample has
significant social value. A sample can be effective only to the extent
that it is familiar and well known, which means that sampled works
have almost invariably achieved both commercial success and broad
123
popularity-the very definition of a high social value work.
Other critics have suggested that copyrights used by their
owners in an offensive manner fall into the high private value/low
social value category. Examples include owners of literary estates who
have enforced copyrights in order to keep famous authors' personal
letters private (e.g., J.D. Salinger, Richard Wright), 124 as well as
Scientologists who have brought copyright suits against former
members to prevent the public release of internal documents relating
to the governance of their religion. 25 The former example does not
seem to fit within this category at all; the work of renowned novelists
generates enormous value for society as well as private value for its
author. One might imagine that Scientologists (or any organization,
for that matter) might acquire costly copyrights for the sole purpose of
suppressing critical public dialogue about itself.126 While this use of
copyright may indeed exact some social costs, such uses are relatively
rare, and in any event, their impact is limited due to copyright's
122. Some writers have compared the music catalog owners' demands for licenses to that of
patent trolls, see Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll: The Shady One-Man Corporation
That's Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/, but this

comparison is inapt. Companies like Bridgeport Music that acquire catalogues of copyrights do so
for the same reason any music publisher acquires musical works: to negotiate licenses for works
in the owner's catalog, and to protect against unauthorized use of those works. Such companies
often create value by clearing rights to bodies of work that have become disorganized and
conflicted. See Bridgeport Music, 383 F.3d at 393-96 (discussing Bridgeport's work with respect
to George Clinton's catalog).
123. This does not mean that the strict 'license all samples" rule is optimal. It may well be
the case that society is better served by allowing free use of samples to facilitate secondgeneration creation. Our point here, though, is merely a descriptive claim that the copyright in
the sampled work belongs in the high social value category, not the low social value category.
124. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
125. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
126. Or it may well be the case that Scientologists would continue to produce religious tracts
even in the absence of exclusive rights, in which case our theory has nothing to say about them
because they are not responding to the profit motivations that characterize the basic copyright
bargain.
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allowing numerous opportunities to engineer around its exclusive
27
rights.'
Ultimately, and most importantly, it is irrelevant to our thesis
whether or not there are any copyrights in the high private value/low
social value quadrant because the existence of a costly screen will not
affect the production of any high private value copyright. For the
purposes of this discussion, we have defined "high private value"
works as those generating profits in excess of the cost of the $22,000
copyright screen. Works that fall into this category (if there are any)
will, by definition, generate sufficient private value to make it worth
authors' time to create them, and will continue to be produced
regardless of whether they are socially suboptimal. 128 Authors will
create such works, in other words, with or without high vesting costs.
So while we remain skeptical that there are many--or even anyworks of authorship that generate high private value but low social
value, that is not an issue that can be affected by the presence or
absence of costly screens, and thus one that is not addressed by this
Article.
3. Low Private Value/Low Social Value Copyrights
Low private value/low social value copyrights bring value to
neither their owner nor society. And thanks to the low threshold
required for copyright vesting, these copyrights are ever more
numerous. At first glance, this seems to create a problem for our claim
that increased process costs would be detrimental to social welfare.
Costly screens cause authors to self-select against the acquisition of
exclusive rights worth less than a given threshold amount (here,
$22,000). In Part II, we explained that the appeal of costly screens for
patents is that they select against this very category. Why, then,
should we not embrace costly screens in copyright for similar reasons?
In this Section, we identify three types of purported low private
value/low social value works that arguably might be eliminated by
imposing substantial process costs as a barrier to vesting exclusive

127. These workarounds are discussed in supra Part III.B.3. Some critics have also
suggested that there are high private value works that have low social value because they are
truly pernicious-child pornography or snuff films, for example. Even if they do belong in this
quadrant, such works are typically not created for private profit but from some other, unsavory
motivation, and their creation would be unaffected by the presence or absence of screens because
creators of these works do not need exclusive rights to profit from them.
128. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 961-65 (2010) (observing that pornography, even if socially
pernicious, will tend to be produced independently of whether it is protected by copyright).
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rights, and we show why none of them actually weigh in favor of that
approach.
First, many-perhaps most-copyrights in this quadrant are
trivial in the sense that they have no social impact whatsoever, good
or bad. Copyright arises in any work meeting the low originality
threshold that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, whether
the author wants exclusive rights or not.129 This is why the third
quadrant is so populous. An email written to a friend, a home movie of
a family gathering, or a doodle drawn on the back of a cocktail napkin
each get the same copyright protection as blockbuster Hollywood
movies or bestselling mystery novels, despite the fact that the value of
the former works to their authors or the public is negligible.
Imposing a costly screen as a vesting requirement would
certainly eliminate these copyrights. But who cares? Even if it were
socially beneficial to cut down on these copyrights by imposing a costly
screen (which would certainly work because, after all, no one is going
to pay $22,000 to preserve exclusive rights in a drawing on the back of
a cocktail napkin 130 ), the presence of trivial and inadvertent
copyrights has no impact on our analysis of the implications of costly
screens. The reason is simple: these works may not create any social
value, but neither are they harmful. Rather, they are innocuous
because they will never be enforced in a socially costly way. In fact,
the average layperson probably does not know (and certainly does not
care) that their email or home movie or doodle happens to be
copyrighted, so these rights, however proliferant, cannot have a
deterrent effect on future creation. These copyrights could be
relegated to oblivion by costly screens, but society wouldn't gain
anything if they were.
'Microworks" may also fall into the low private value/low social
value category. Several scholars have expressed concern that the
copyright in very small works of authorship, such as the individual
author contributions that make up the popular online encyclopedia
Wikipedia, will prohibit future creation because the transaction costs
(and litigation fears) associated with using such material are
prohibitively high.13 1 The concern is that small copyrights may allow
their owners to engage in socially costly but privately lucrative
holdouts, which has been a major driver of the anticommons problem

129. For an interesting narrative illuminating the frequency with which we all create-and
infringe-copyrights on a regular basis, see John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright
Enforcement and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537.
130. Unless the author's name happens to be Picasso.
131. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 8,at 575-76; Van Houweling, supra note 8,at 563.
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in the patent setting.132 Consider, for example, Wikipedia. 133 Every
sentence in a given Wikipedia entry could be copyrighted by a
separate author, since the site's entries are collaboratively written by
many different people. Reproducing a Wikipedia entry, then, may
seem to raise all manner of ex ante transaction costs (striking
licensing deals with numerous owners) or ex post litigation fears
(deriving from numerous acts of infringement against those owners).
For those who share this concern, costly screens may seem like an
ideal way to select against copyrighted microworks and reduce their
multiplication.
Upon closer examination, though, we do not believe that costly
copyrights would generate significant benefits. The reason is that, for
the most part, microworks do not present a significant risk of welfarediminishing holdouts. This is because the numerous limitations on
owners' exclusive rights and opportunities for users to work around
those rights that we discussed earlier 134 preclude, or at least starkly
1 35
limit, the kind of holdout concerns that affect patent law.
Wikipedia 13 6 -a commonly cited example for the potential dangers of
microworks-illustrates this point. First, the likelihood that the owner
of a Wikipedia sentence will sue someone for infringement seems
vanishingly small, both because owners aren't likely to even know that
they have a copyright and because people rarely, if ever, contribute to
Wikipedia for financial reasons.1 37 Indeed, Encyclopedia Britannica
never sued individuals for using its materials, and in fact explicitly

132. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1321 (1996) (discussing holdouts and
other anticommons-like concerns derived from excess copyright).
133. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 8, at 563-64 (citing Wikipedia as an example of a
"microwork" that would be socially counterproductive if subject to copyright).
134. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing copyright's various limitations and workarounds).
135. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of PrivateProperty, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1175, 1175
n.61 (1999) ("Compared with patent law, copyright law's tragedy of the anticommons is less
costly. The 'fair use' doctrine means that copyright holders do not have the right to exclude
nonowners from low-intensity uses of protected works."). We stress that this does not necessarily
mean that copyright is a "narrow" ownership interest in some absolute sense but only that
copyright is significantly, and meaningfully, narrower than patent.
136. Van Houweling, supra note 8, at 621-22 (discussing Wikipedia as an example of a
microwork that may create socially costly holdouts). We should emphasize that we agree with a
significant proportion of Professor Van Houweling's excellent article on atomism in intellectual
property. Indeed, her theory undergirds much of the argument we put forth above regarding
patents. But on this particular point we do not think that the threat of holdouts from microworks
is large enough to justify substantially increasing the costs of obtaining a copyright.
137. On the contrary, Wikipedia contributors include material largely in order to gain fame
and/or contribute to a store of knowledge, so they would likely want others to use their material.
See Andrew George, Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 33-34 (2007)
(discussing the importance of status among peers as a driver of production among Wikipedians).
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permitted such uses in noncommercial settings. 138 But even if it were
the case that the owner of the copyright in a Wikipedia paragraph
sued a user for infringement, the defendant would have a host of
plausible statutory defenses. Fair use would be a promising candidate
if, as seems likely, the defendant were using the Wikipedia microwork
in an academic and/or noncommercial setting. 139 The defendant would
also possess many plausible alternatives for workarounds. For
instance, the idea/expression dichotomy would allow a defendant to
appropriate as much factual information from Wikipedia as they
wanted to, so long as they expressed those facts in an original
manner. 140
A third and final copyright may also fall into the low private
value/low social value category. Orphan works are those whose
copyright ownership has become unclear and prohibitively difficult to
trace.14 1 Creators who wish to use orphan works find themselves in a
double bind. They can use the work, raising the possibility that the
owner will emerge later and demand exorbitant damages or seek a
crippling injunction. Or they can forego use in light of these litigation
fears. One of the most familiar examples of orphan works is old
newsreel footage. The current owners of the rights in decades-old
newsreels can rarely be ascertained from the newsreels themselves, so
that documentary filmmakers interested in using the newsreels must
either engage in a costly search to clear rights to the work, or use the
footage and face the ongoing risk of costly litigation-all this despite
that the newsreel almost certainly no longer generates much value for

138. In fact, Encyclopedia Britannica's copyright policy explicitly allows for copying of its
material under many circumstances. See Terms of Use, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (Aug. 26,
2011), http://corporate.britannica.com/termsofuse.html ('You may display, reproduce, print or
download content on the Services only for your personal, non-commercial use. If you are a
teacher, scholar or student, you may copy reasonable portions of the content for lesson plans,
interactive whiteboards, reports, dissertations, presentations, school newspapers and for similar
nonprofit educational purposes to the extent permitted by applicable law.").
139. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (identifying "scholarship" and "research" as illustrative fair uses,
and indicating that the noncommercial character of a use weighs in favor of fair use).
140. One might rejoin that there are some facts or ideas so simple that there is only one way
that they can be expressed. To the extent that this is the case, copyright law again sides with
users. The merger doctrine holds that when a fact or idea is capable of only a single expression,
future users are free to copy that expression, regardless of the owner's exclusive rights. See, e.g.,
Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting the idea that similarity
in expression cannot be used to show copyright infringement when there is only one way or only
a few ways of expressing an idea).
141. For a good overview of the orphan works issue, including summaries of relevant
legislative efforts and other government documents, see Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
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its owner. 142 And because few of these copyrights actually earn value
for their owners, it may initially appear that they fall into the low
private value/low social value category, so that imposing costly screens
would have the salubrious effect of eliminating them.
The orphan works problem, and the specter of related nuisance
litigation, raises serious concerns, and has spawned pending
legislation designed to allay the concerns of future creators in order to
encourage the use of these works. 143 It is probably the case that
orphan works generate only low private value and low social value
now, but this is irrelevant to our thesis, which concerns only the
private and social value of copyrights at the time of vesting. At the
time of their vesting, newsreels likely generated value for their
creators, who licensed them to be shown before feature films, and for
society, who relied on them for news and entertainment. That these
initially valuable works have since migrated across classes of value
from the first (high private value/high social value) to the third (low
private value/low social value) quadrant does not relate to our
investigation into how screens affect the initial decision to acquire a
copyright. Indeed, if our conjecture that most orphan works were
initially both socially and privately valuable is correct, then it is likely
that they would still be created even if the costs of acquiring a
144
copyright were raised significantly.
4. Low Private Value/High Social Value Copyrights
The fourth and final category of copyrights contains those that
generate positive value for the public, but only a little value for their
owners. With patents, this quadrant did not concern us because it was
largely empty. By contrast, there are numerous low private value/
high social value copyrights, and as a result the dynamics of costly
screens operate quite differently in this setting.
It may initially seem counterintuitive that a work could create
significant value for society while the associated copyright could fail to
create correlative high value for its owner. This is, as we have shown,
essentially never the case with patents. But particularly as compared
142. See LESSIG, supra note 96, at 97-99 (2004) (discussing orphan works as a hurdle to the
creation of documentary films).
143. E.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008). See
generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 22 (2006), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
144. We stress that the concerns we raise about process costs at the outset of copyright
vesting do not warrant skepticism about formalities that arise after copyright vesting. Indeed,
such proposals appear to impose process costs in a way that do not raise the specter of deterring
the creation of socially valuable works, and may well be a good idea.
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to patent, copyright law's narrow ownership entitlements allow
owners to internalize much less of the overall value that their work
generates. 145 This imbalance between the capacity of works of
authorship to create positive externalities--"spillovers" in Frischmann
and Lemley's phrasing 146-and the incapacity of copyrights to accrue
that value for owners means that copyright generates a great deal of
works whose social value is significant despite earning relatively little
private value for its author. Indeed, a copyright must generate
significant social value if the relatively smaller amount of that value
that owners can internalize is going to provide authors sufficient
incentive to create.
In a world animated by our hypothetical costly screen, then,
when the amount of value authors can extract from a given copyright
falls below $22,000, authors will typically not create the associated
work, regardless of whether that outcome is bad for the public. 147
Costly screens would thus suppress production of low private value/
high social value copyrights, causing society to bear the losses that

145. See supra Part ITI.B.2.
146. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 109 (referring to positive externalities created by
intellectual property generally as "spillovers").
147. We do not mean to discount the possibility that authors will create for reasons
unrelated to copyright. Some works are created not for profit, but simply because the author
wants to share an idea with the world (this Article is one of them). See generally YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 2-7 (2006) (discussing nonmarket production of creative
work). But cf. Lior Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1495-97 (2007)
(expressing skepticism about Benkler's enthusiasm for nonmarket production). Other authors
may create work independently of the existence of copyright because they are incentivized by
subcultural norms rather than formal exclusive rights. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Chris Sprigman,
There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (showing that stand-up
comedians create jokes independently of copyright's incentives).
Such authors will continue to create works regardless of costly screens, but because of thisindeed, because such authors are largely indifferent to copyright-they are not a class of creators
that is relevant to our thesis. As we explained at the outset, costly screen theory can explain only
those actors who create copyrights out of a desire for financial reward. And because this
economic incentivist model is the core premise of the U.S. intellectual property system, our thesis
retains substantial leverage even in the presence of works motivated by other than pecuniary
gain.
And as the examples we discuss in this Section illustrate, most works in the low private
value/high social value quadrant are created out of at least some desire for profit. This is
certainly true of thinly copyrighted works like directories or works that require numerous
copyrights like news photos; no author makes either of these kinds of works purely from creative
desire. And while we can imagine that some authors would pen brilliant works even knowing
they would be commercial failures, most authors write in the hope of earning at least enough to
make a living. This explains why even now almost all authors of significant literary works seek
to publish their books for profit, rather than simply making them available for free on the
internet.
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result when such works go unproduced. Consider three categories of
copyrights that would be especially vulnerable to costly screens.
First are "thinly" copyrighted works, like phone directories,
information databases, or any useful compilation of facts. 148 Copyright
law already limits the profitability of these fact-intensive works,
extending to them slender exclusive rights limited only to their
original selection or arrangement of facts. 149 Because creators of data
compilations already face limited profit margins, costly screens would
be particularly likely to preclude their production.
Second, consider creators who require numerous copyrights to
protect their exclusive rights. A freelance news photographer, for
example, may take hundreds of pictures in a week, depending on
exclusive rights in all of them just to make sure that the few that are
published are used with permission and for a fee. 150 Freelance writers
work on a similar model, and would be loath to shop their work
around to publishing outlets in the absence of some legal recourse
against use without permission. In a slightly different vein are
authors who create a very high number of distinct works on a regular
basis, such as television news stations, which create numerous
separate broadcasts daily. In a world requiring a $22,000 threshold for
copyright vesting, the price of protecting multiple works would
skyrocket for each of these authors. Less well-capitalized actors, such
as impecunious freelance writers or photographers, would likely be
priced out of their profession. And only broadcast news stations that
were parts of wealthy conglomerates would be able to sustain the costs
of associated copyrights, driving smaller-scale news outlets out of the
business.
Finally, and most saliently, consider the socially valuable work
that is nevertheless a commercial failure for its copyright owner.
George Lucas may be the emblematic owner for whom the copyright
system works ideally, but he is also the exception rather than the
rule. 151 The relationship between the true quality and the commercial
148. See 4 MELvILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (2001)
(discussing thinly copyrighted works).
149. E.g., Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991) (holding that
copyright in factual compilations is limited to originality in selection or arrangement of facts).
150. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 98, at 342-43 (discussing the unique difficulties vesting costs
would impose on authors who depend on the creation of multiple works).

151. Even Lucas struggled initially. His first feature film, THX 1138, arguably falls in the
low private value/high
social value quadrant. See THX
1138, LUCASFILM,
http://www.lucasfilm.com/films/other/thx1138.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) ("Stark and
austere, the striking visual wasteland of Lucas' faceless future floundered in its initial release at
the box office but later gained traction among cult audiences and critics."). Though later
considered to be a socially valuable film in its own right, THX 113,?s greatest value may have
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appeal of a work of authorship is weak at best, and this disparity is
exacerbated by the extent to which copyright's relatively narrow scope
limits owners' abilities to internalize the social value-positive
externalities-created by their works. One example of the brilliant
commercial failure is the work whose true value is only understood
well after its publication. Herman Melville's Moby-Dick is widely
considered one of the great American novels, but sold so miserably
152
that its author had to abandon writing to seek an income elsewhere.
Vincent Van Gogh's paintings are some of the most original and
influential in history. Yet no one wanted them during Van Gogh's
154
life, 153 although today they are valued at tens of millions of dollars.
Many less famous works also generate social value well in excess of
the private value they accrue for owners. Films may fail at the box
office, but introduce influential tropes and concepts that are
unprotected (and therefore unprofitable for owners) 155 because they
amount to unprotectable ideas. 156 Academic treatises rarely earn
significant profits for their authors, 157 though they too may generate
highly socially valuable insights about their subject matters. And
many nonfamous artists sell paintings for modest prices that could
well understate the social value in terms of aesthetic pleasure that
those works generate.
In our current world, where copyrights vest automatically,
artists need not negotiate any screens in order to secure rights in their
works. They thus remain freer to experiment, taking shots with
innovative works that promise to push the envelope of artistic or
literary expression, even if the attempt is not that commercially
successful, perhaps in the hope that their ideas will catch fire and
make them millionaires. But in a world where securing a copyright
come from its influence on Lucas's subsequent filmmaking. See The Influence and Imagery of
Akira Kurosawa,THE SECRET HISTORY OF STAR WARS, http://secrethistoryofstarwars.coml

kurosawal.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) ('Annoyed by the rejection and failure of THX 1138,
Lucas instead turned his attention to the opposite direction: he deliberately set out to make a
commercial film. With this was born American Graffiti ...").
152. ANDREW DELBANCO, MELVILLE: HIS WORLD AND WORK 6-7 (2005).

153. In one famous anecdote, a baker said to Van Gogh, "No more bread," when Van Gogh
again tried to trade paintings for food.
154. See G. Fernandez, The Most Expensive Paintings Ever Sold, THE ARTWOLF.COM ONLINE
ART MAG., http://www.theartwolf.com10_expensive.htm (listing the substantial prices paid for
various Van Gogh works).
155. The Marx Brothers' DUCK SouP (Paramount Pictures 1933) is now considered their best
and most highly influential work, but it was a critical and commercial failure at the time of its
release. See Duck Soup (1933), FILMSITE MOVIE REVIEW, http://www.ffilmsite.org/duck.html.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (ideas are not copyrightable).
157. One of us can personally attest to this point. See DAVID FAGUNDES & ROBERT C. LIND,
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: COPYRIGHT LAW (LexisNexis 2010).
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requires a heavy front-end payment of $22,000, the possibility of
commercial failure will deter many such innovative creators. Realistic
creators will likely balk at the idea of having to invest additional tens
of thousands of dollars in work that is not likely to recoup even the
cost of the screen. And while wildly optimistic authors might be
inclined to invest in a costly copyright despite their low chances of
success, they may well lack the funds to do it. Of course, third-party
companies like publishing houses or movie studios could step in to
finance costly copyrights, as they finance other costs of creation. But
in a world where such intermediaries were necessary, the resulting
creative products would likely be those calculated to maximize the
intermediaries' profits rather than to generate positive but not
internalizable spillover benefits like innovative ideas or novel artistic
forms.
Even if copyright owners were required to navigate costly
screens for their exclusive rights to vest, many copyrights would arise
and creative work would persist. Lucasfilm would still make Star
Wars movies despite $22,000 worth of process costs because it will still
earn scads of cash even though it cannot charge a royalty every time
someone says, 'May the force be with you." But the indifference of
wealthy and institutional creators to costly screens should not cause
us to dismiss the effect of those screens on less well-capitalized
creators. The less privately remunerative copyrights that costly
screens would deter do not necessarily create less social value than
their privately lucrative counterparts. Requiring copyright owners to
bear the costs of a cumbersome process prior to vesting would inflict
heavy, though not obvious, costs on the public as well.

Copyrights array very differently than patents across the four
classes of value because they are constructed differently, and more
narrowly, than patents. The first quadrant-high private value/high
social value-is heavily populated with familiar examples of
commercially successful works. The second quadrant-high private
value/low social value-lies empty because copyrights that produce
only low social value likely cannot allow their authors enough leverage
to extract meaningful private value. The third quadrant-low private
value/low social value-is heavily populated, albeit with largely
innocuous copyrights. The final quadrant-low private value/high
social value-is crowded as well, with copyrights that are valuable for
society but that do not allow their authors to extract enough value to
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clear the price of a costly screen. We summarize these relationships in
Table 4 below:
TABLE 4: SOCIAL AND PRIVATE VALUES OF
VARIOUS COPYRIGHT CLASSES

High social value
High
private
value

Commercially
valuable, socially
popular copyrights
(Star Wars films;
Harry Potter books)

Low
private
value

Thin copyrights
(directories,
compilations);
valuable commercial
failures; iterative
copyrights

Low or negative
social value
Vanishingly few

'Microworks"; trivial
and inadvertent
works

As this table illustrates, the second and fourth quadrants of the
copyright grid are populated inversely to the patent setting. While
there are many high private value/low social value patents and few
low private value/high social value patents, just the opposite is the
case with copyright. As a result, application of costly screens in
copyright would be counterproductive rather than beneficial. If
copyright vesting required navigation of a process costing about as
much as patent examination does, a crucial class of authors would be
systematically deterred from creating works. Those authors seeking to
make works that promise enormous social benefits but only paltry
private ones would simply decline to produce such works, regardless of
the lost public benefits. Of course, one might point out that these
social costs might be offset by the other effect of a costly screen:
selecting against low private value/low social value copyrights. But as
we have seen, most low private value/low social value works are
simply innocuous rather than socially harmful, so that the benefits of
reducing them would be negligible. It is for these reasons, we believe,
that the copyright system is sensibly devoid of high vesting costs.
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IV. COSTLY SCREENS IN BROADER CONTEXT

Refracting copyright and patent through the lens of costly
screen analysis provides related insights about each of these fields. It
explains why the dearth of process prior to copyright vesting and the
burdensome process accompanying patent grants are each more
beneficial than the current literature suggests. In this Part, we
observe two points beyond our core insight about the efficiency of the
present IP vesting system. First, we propose a unified theory of IP
process that draws on our earlier discussion of costly screens to
explain why law places such disparate hurdles in the paths of patent
and copyright owners. Second, we look at other legal contexts whose
administrative structures (or lack thereof) can be illuminated by the
efficiency (or inefficiency) of costly screens.
A. A Unified Theory of IP Process
Many writers have sought to explain why patents arise only
after a cumbersome examination process, while copyrights vest
immediately upon fixation without any process at all. Prior analyses
have looked to the differential scope of the rights conferred by patent
and copyright law; 158 the divergent social aims of the two fields; 159 the
relative difficulty of evaluating the quality of the subject matter
protected by patent versus copyright; 160 and the incentives created by
the different degrees of searching required for each of the rights to
vest. 161 Yet despite these numerous attempts, scholars have yet to
provide a persuasive explanation for the puzzling disparity between
these two systems.1 62
158. E.g., Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983) (arguing that
because patent is a broader-and potentially more socially costly-right than copyright, there
should be more barriers to its vesting). We distinguish our theory from Olson's later in this
Section.
159. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1, at 63-64 (1989)
(arguing that patent seeks only to encourage efficient production of information, while copyright
seeks to encourage as much information production as possible, requiring more limits on the
creation of patents).
160. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 469-70,
487-89 (2004) (arguing that it makes more sense to have barriers to the creation of patents
because their subject matter is susceptible to objective judgments, while works of authorship are
relatively more subjective).
161. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 14647 (1991) (arguing that the barriers associated with patent encourage more searching, causing
researchers to learn more and refine their work more carefully).
162. For an excellent discussion of each of these explanations and how they fail to fully
explain the differences between the two systems, see Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1453-56 (2010).
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The costly screening model we have developed here provides
the most coherent account of the divergent methods by which patents
and copyrights are awarded. In contrast to the foregoing theories,
which seek to explain IP's vesting disparities in terms of the different
subject matter governed by each system, we offer a unified theory of
the administrative processes surrounding intellectual property-a
theory of "IP process"--centered on the costs of those processes. Our
theory is based on the relative strengths of the intellectual property
rights awarded, but not in the most obvious sense. Patents are not
examined simply because they involve stronger property rights and
thus could do more damage than copyrights if granted imprudently.
Copyrights do not arise merely upon fixation in a tangible medium of
expression only because they are weaker rights that pose little threat
if they spring into being haphazardly and easily. Such a simplistic
explanation cannot account for the fact that patent examination is
highly unreliable-the PTO grants many invalid patents-yet has
been allowed to persist. If patents (and not copyrights) are examined
purely because improperly granted patents can cause harm, the
current system is surely failing.
The effect of these differences between patents and copyrights
is, instead, indirect. The strength of the intellectual property right
defines the various classes of value that each entitlement will create.
Because patent rights are broad, low private value/high social value
patents do not exist. A patent would allow an inventor to capture
much of the benefit from any patent that created significant social
value. Similarly, because copyrights are narrow, high private
value/low social value copyrights do not exist-they are too easy to
engineer around. On the other hand, low private value/high social
value copyrights are plentiful.
Accordingly, costly screens embedded within the patent and
copyright systems will disproportionately select against different
classes of intellectual property rights by affecting how and whether
those rights vest in the first instance. In the patent context, there
exists a good argument for costly screens. Due to the distinctive value
asymmetries created by the relative strength of patent as a property
right, screens preclude only the production of inventions that create
zero or negative social value. Inventions that create high social value
but generate little value for their owners exist in negligible numbers
at best, so denying them patents by using costly screens does not
reduce social welfare.
But copyright presents a different story. The prevalence of low
private value/high social value works suggests that imposing screens
as a precondition to the acquisition of copyright would be
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counterproductive. The costlier the screen, the more likely it is that
authors will decline to create works where they are skeptical of
clearing the value of the screen. In copyright, unlike in patent,
erecting costly screens as a prerequisite to vesting raises serious
concerns about precluding the creation of works that are enriching for
society even though they generate little value for their authors.
Once the current system of patent examination-as well as a
hypothetical system of copyright examination or fees-is understood
as a costly screen, the final piece of this puzzle falls into place. The
breadth of the patent right creates an asymmetry that the costly
patent screen exploits in a way that creates social welfare; the
comparatively narrow copyright creates an asymmetry that would
interact with a costly screen in ways likely harmful to social welfare.
The breadth of the intellectual property right defines the appropriate
shape-and cost-of the process used to bestow it.
This is, at one level, a descriptive claim: the reason that patent
and copyright have such different vesting thresholds is that these
vesting thresholds select differently across the different classes of
value created by patent (a broader right) and copyright (a weaker
one). But this descriptive claim is inextricable from our normative
argument. Our theory of IP process works because patent's costly
screens and copyright's lack of them encourage invention and creation
at a socially beneficial level. This theory thus implies that the current
patent and copyright systems are both unfairly maligned, albeit in
very different ways. The standard account is that patent places too
many expensive roadblocks in the way of acquiring exclusive rights, 163
while copyright has a problematically low vesting threshold. 164 Costly
screen theory, and in particular, our theory of IP process,
demonstrates why each of these systems may in fact be much closer to
optimal than is typically believed.
We hasten to add that we do not mean to claim that the
congressional architects of the intellectual property system intended
or understood this result. The patent examination and copyright
registration systems most likely arose for other reasons, or through

163. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting Kieffs and Mossoffs suggestions
for reform, such as elimination of the patent examination system altogether).
164. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 97, at 221-31 (arguing for reintroduction of formalities in
order to weed out socially negative copyrights); cf., e.g., LESSIG, supra note 96, at 289-91
(advocating for reforms in the registration, renewal, and marking requirements for copyrights);
Sprigman, supra note 102, at 517 (suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for
property-rule enforcement of copyright infringement).
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historical accident. 165 But it would be odd to imagine that these
systems could persist through two centuries if they did not lead to
improvements in societal well-being. 66 Our theory of IP process,
animated by the idea of costly screens, shows that this is likely the
case. There is a deep relationship between how statutory rights in
information are constructed and what kind of process is optimal to
govern the vesting of those rights.
B. Process Costs and Cognate Fields
1. Beneficially Costly Law Systems
Our argument that costly screens are beneficial for the patent
system rested on the premise that while the examination process is
substantively ineffective, it still produces value by forcing applicants
to select against seeking patents that have only low private value. And
because of patent's distinctive asymmetry-namely, that there are no
or vanishingly few patents of low private value that also generate high
social value-this effect is on-balance positive for social welfare. In
this Section, we abstract this insight onto the law more generally,
identifying two cognate fields characterized by high process costs. We
then show why those processes-typically criticized as excessively
cumbersome-may be more socially beneficial than is commonly
thought.
Begin with due process protections. Many employees may only
be fired "for good cause" as a matter of either contract or state or
federal law.1 67 Employers seeking to discharge employees subject to
these protections typically must provide the employees with hearings
165. There is a straightforward historical story to be told about this divergence, of course.
The modern PTO grew out of the Patent Board established by the Patent Act of 1790. See P.J.
Frederico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 33, 33-35
(2003) (describing the formation and original functions of the Patent Board). The lack of
formalities required for copyrights to vest reflects international norms brought to bear on U.S.
law by our obligations under the Berne Convention. See InternationalCopyright, UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl1OO.html ('There are no formal requirements
in the Berne Convention."). Neither of these narratives, however, provides an explanation of why
patent and copyright processes have developed in such different ways.
166. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 614 (5th ed. 1998)

(explaining the "apparent tendency of the common law to develop efficient rules of conduct" and
the counterarguments to this proposition).
167. See, e.g., 55 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/3-7012 (2007) ("Except as is otherwise provided in this
Division, no deputy sheriff in the County Police Department, no full-time deputy sheriff not
employed as a county police officer or county corrections officer and no employee in the County
Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or suspended except for cause, upon
written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff and a hearing before the Board thereon upon
not less than 10 days' notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof.").
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before neutral arbiters and show that good cause for termination
exists. 168 Employers have certain advantages in these hearings,
particularly repeat-player status and the resources to hire
attorneys. 169 At the same time, they also bear some asymmetric costs:
they must often create and fund the hearing board, 170 and they must
pay employee wages during hearing pendency (and often cannot
recover those wages if they are victorious at the hearing).171 Numerous
critics have suggested that such hearings do little but
counterproductively raise employers' costs, 72 but this ignores their
costly screening function. Forcing employers to bear the costs of
termination hearings causes them to select against terminations that
are not worth the administrative trouble-a private decision that the
employer is in the best position to make. Moreover, the asymmetries
at play in this context mirror those at play in patents. Few
terminations will generate high social value but only low private value
for employers (indeed, such an example is hard to imagine). More
likely, if it is worth an employer's time and trouble to navigate the
thicket of a due process hearing, society will also benefit-an employee
that bad is almost certainly inflicting general social costs as well.

168. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) ("The essence of due
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Bd. of Regents of
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) ("[W]here a person's good name, reputation, honor,
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential.") (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971)).
169. Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
859, 863-64 (1996) (discussing the disparate interests and incentives of corporate defendants'
and plaintiffs' attorneys); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (asserting that "differences in their
size, differences in the state of the law, and differences in their resources" distinguish between
"repeat players" and "one-shotters" in the legal system). In some instances, employees will be
represented by collective bargaining units who are also repeat players, which may serve to
mitigate these advantages to some extent.
170. See, e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-7003 (2007) (stating that each Illinois county is
responsible for paying the salary and expenses of the members of the boards established to
conduct due process hearings for county employees).
171. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) ("[Tlermination of aid pending resolution
of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits.").
172. See, e.g., Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (suggesting
that the "costs and benefits of alternative remedial mechanisms" should drive the determination
of the options for recourse made available by an employer to its employees).
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Consider also housing evictions. Landlords may not exercise
173
self-help and summarily lock out tenants who breach their leases.
Rather, tenants are entitled to summary eviction proceedings 174 that
tend to advantage and disadvantage landlords for the same reasons as
termination hearings: landlords enjoy helpful repeat-player status,
but have to bear costs associated with eviction. 175 Many critics have
argued that this procedure is prohibitively costly for landlords, who
have to bear most of the costs of the process even though the tenants
were delinquent, 176 as well as tenants, whose involvement in eviction
proceedings can be located by future landlords, which permanently
taints their chances of obtaining housing. 77 Here too, though, this
critical scholarship fails to take into account the costly screen function
of eviction proceedings. The process costs imposed by summary
evictions function as a helpful information-forcing device, causing
landlords to limit their evictions only to those tenants whose
delinquency is so privately costly that it exceeds the costs of eviction
itself-an assessment that landlords are uniquely well-suited to make.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that there will be any evictions that
generate low benefits to landlords but high benefits to society at large;
the low private value/high social value quadrant of the grid is
empty. 178 A tenant troublesome enough to make a landlord undergo an

173. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 408-10 (6th ed. 2006) (describing the growing

trend among states to prohibit self-help as a permissible remedial measure for landlords and the
increased availability of summary proceedings as an alternative).
174. See generally A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 923 A.2d 628, 628-30 (Conn.
2007) (corporate tenant entitled to certain specific processes); Hughes v. Sanders, 847 So. 2d 165,
167 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (tenants entitled to adequate service of process in addition to summary
eviction proceedings); Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, 865 N.E.2d 741, 744-45 (Mass. 2007)
(summary eviction process used to remove tenant accused of endangering other residents, in
accordance with lease agreement).
175. In California, for example, even where a landlord successfully shows cause for eviction,
he must remove the tenant's belongings from the premises and place them in a storage facilityat his own expense. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1990 (West 2011) (describing the amounts and methods
for reimbursement of a landlord's initial posteviction storage expenses).
176. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chi., 819 F.2d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.) (reinforcing the notion that landlords are responsible for most costs associated with
the rental process by upholding a municipal ordinance allowing tenants to withhold rent
payments to the extent of a landlord's failure to comply with the lease terms and allowing a
credit against rent expenses for repairs a tenant undertakes herself).
177. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1679 (2008) ("Evictions via summary proceedings ...
necessarily generate public records, and it is those public records that will prove so damaging to
tenants the next time they try to rent an apartment.").
178. A full analysis of this question is well beyond the scope of this Article, but there is a
plausible story to be told that eviction valuations function in precisely this way. Any high social
value eviction-for instance, the eviction of a disruptive tenant who is violent and engaged in
illegal activity-likely holds high private value as well; the disruption strikes most heavily at
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eviction proceeding is likely to make life difficult for others as well (by
making noise or failing to keep up the premises, for example). It is
entirely possible, then, that the process costs of summary evictions
generate significant social welfare via their screening function.
2. Beneficially Costless Law Systems
Just as our process costs approach to patents explains how
other complex administrative procedures generate unappreciated
benefits, our costly screen analysis of copyright illuminates how at
least one area of law, prior restraints on speech, notable for a striking
absence of administrative procedure may have an internal logic
beyond what commentators have typically appreciated.
The United States has a long tradition of opposition to blocking
speech before its release to the public, instead preferring to allow
speakers to interact freely in the belief that an unfettered exchange of
ideas is the best way to encourage democratic dialogue. 179 As a result,
courts have been particularly skeptical of anything that looks like a
licensing procedure for speech.1 80 Licenses for the press (which were
common in colonial America) are per se illegal,1 81 and state action that
even resembles licensure of speech (e.g., licenses for parades, and even
18 2
regulation of vanity license plates) has been invalidated.

other nearby tenants who are often under the auspices of the same landlord. The paradigmatic
low private value/low social value eviction might be a tenant who is not disruptive but is
delinquent on rent; turning such a tenant out onto the street might lead to crime and social
disruption. This is the category of eviction against which a costly screen will select. The danger
posed by such a screening mechanism is that tenants will exploit the procedural costs involved
with eviction by breaching their leases in minor ways, up to the point of making eviction
worthwhile. Like any transaction cost, then, the costly screen could inhibit efficiency-enhancing
transactions by enabling unnecessary bad behavior. Nonetheless, this danger may be less
pronounced in residential housing than in other contexts. Tenants are likely to be highly risk
averse-the downside risk of miscalculating and being evicted is substantial, and renters are
often people with little margin to spare-and thus less inclined to push their luck.
179. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (roundly rejecting prior restraint).
180. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1965) (invalidating a licensing scheme
requiring approval from the municipal board as a precondition of permission to license the
showing of films).
181. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) ('The presumption against
prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of protection broader-than that against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties.").
182. E.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 626-27 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating restrictions on license plates for a heritage
organization); MacDonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664, 676-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating a
parade permit system as an impermissible prior restraint).
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There are well-rehearsed constitutional and prudential reasons
for the per se rule against prior restraints, 8 3 though some writers
have cast doubt on the latter. 8 4 Here, we seek to advance an
additional rationale for the rule against prior restraints that is rooted
in process costs. If courts permitted licensure of speech, the resulting
administrative apparatus would cause would-be speakers to limit
speech only to instances where the private value of their speech was
greater than the cost of a license. In many cases, this would be socially
costless, where the speech at issue generated only low social value as
well (it is, after all, easy to ignore annoying or inane speech). But it is
possible, as with copyright, to imagine numerous instances where
speech has relatively low private value (because it may not be
particularly remunerative) but high social value (because the public
finds it inspiring, or edifying, or beautiful). This is because speech,
creates
to
copyright,
subject
like
works
of authorship
disproportionately high positive externalities-such as aesthetic
enjoyment and intellectual insight-that cannot be recouped by its
creator.
Take, for instance, street performers. Sure, most of them are
terrible, but they can be easily tuned out or walked past, so those that
create low social value are basically innocuous. Some street
performers are pretty good, though, and bring value by making city
streets more colorful and giving passersby a brief moment of aesthetic
pleasure. Regardless of whether they create low or high social value,
though, almost all street performers make little enough that a
18 5
licensing requirement would put them out of business.
Much the same is true of publicly distributed flyers. While
most of them deservedly go straight to the trash, some of them may

183. E.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 11, 24 (1981) (arguing that prior restraints are worse than other kinds of speech
restrictions because they induce self-censorship, expand the scope of government control over
expression, and delay the dissemination of speech).
184. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 549-50
(1977) (questioning whether prior restraints actually are a uniquely pernicious form of speech
regulation); cf. CASS SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE THEM,

WHAT CAN BE DONE 9-10 (2009) (questioning the idea that more speech is always better by
observing that misleading and inflammatory speech can cause mass misperceptions and
undermine democratic dialogue).
185. Popular folk singer Tracy Chapman performed for spare change in Harvard Square
before she was discovered by her record label, see Stephen Thomas Erlewine, Tracy Chapman,
ALLMUSIC, http://allmusic.com/artist/tracy-chapman-p3874biography (last visited Apr. 12, 2012)
(biography of Chapman); Tracy Chapman, HarvardSquare, 1985, ABOUT TRACY CHAPMAN (Apr.
http://www.about-tracy-chapman.netltracy-chapman-harvard-square-1985/
14,
2006),
(photograph of Chapman busking in Harvard Square), but she's the commercially successful
exception that proves the rule.
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articulate important and creative ideas. Our own American Revolution
was affected to a nontrivial extent by ideas propounded in publicly
distributed, privately made pamphlets.1 8 6 But making flyers for
indiscriminate public consumption is hardly a highly remunerative
endeavor, so if such speech were subject to a costly license it would
likely be stamped out, along with the social value it creates. So as
each of these examples illustrate, the costs of screening out speech of
low private value but high social value would overbear any trivial
advantages of eliminating low private value/low social value speech,
which suggests that speech licensure exacts net social welfare costs,
independent of whether it is constitutionally suspect.
CONCLUSION

Patents do not come cheaply to applicants. Copyrights, on the
other hand, arise costlessly, frequently, and even unintentionally. The
stark contrast between the onerous patent examination process and
the easy, instantaneous vesting of copyrights seems puzzling. These
systems have also drawn criticism as causing valueless copyrights to
proliferate while placing unnecessary burdens on patentees.
Examining this problem through the prism of costly screen theory
helps to make sense of the difference between these very different
systems for vesting property rights in information, and it reveals one
reason that these much-maligned processes may not be as problematic
as they are commonly described.
While navigating the cumbersome patent examination process
can exact social costs, it also has the advantage of eliminating low
social value patents (while precluding the creation of no or few high
social value patents). Copyright's screenlessness, on the other hand,
may permit the creation of numerous low social value copyrights, but
these copyrights are relatively innocuous, and the ease of vesting
assures the continued creation of high social value copyrights that
would be eliminated by the imposition of costly process prior to
vesting. Our analysis points in the direction of a unified theory of IP
process, one that illuminates the foundational connection between
how law structures intellectual property rights and how that structure
necessitates particular processes for granting those rights.

186. An example is Thomas Paine's Common Sense (1776), which challenged the authority of
the British Crown at a crucial time in late colonial America. The text of this pamphlet is
available at http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/commonsense/text.html.
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The criminal law's formal criteria for assessing punishment
are typically contained in criminal codes, the rules of which fix an
offender's liability and the grade of the offense. A look at how the
punishment decisionmaking process actually works, however,
suggests that courts and other decisionmakers frequently go beyond
the formal legal factors and take account of what might be called
"extralegalpunishment factors" ('XPFs").
XPFs, the subject of this Article, include matters as diverse as
an offender's apology, remorse, history of good or bad deeds, public
acknowledgment of guilt, special talents, old age, extralegal
suffering from the offense, as well as forgiveness or outrage by the
victim, and special hardship of the punishment for the offender or
his family. Such XPFs can make a difference at any point in the
criminaljustice process at which decisionmakers exercise discretion,
such as when prosecutors decide what charge to press, when judges
decide which sentence to impose, when parole boards decide when to
release a prisoner, and when executive officials decide whether to
grant clemency, as well as in less-visible exercises of discretion, such
as in decisions by police officers and trialjurors.
After a review of the current use and rationales behind
eighteen common XPFs in Part I, the Article reports in Part II the
results of an empirical study of lay intuitions regarding the
propriety of taking such factors into account in adjusting the
punishment that otherwise would be imposed, the extent of any
adjustment to be made, as well as an assessment of how the views
might change with different kinds of offenses and how they might
vary with demographicfactors.

Part III examines the implications of the study findings for
current law and practice, with special attention to the problem of
disparity in application that is invited by the high levels of
disagreement on the proper role of some XPFs and the problem of
conflicts between lay intuitions and current law and practice. It is
not uncommon that there is strong support for reliance upon XPFs
that current practice ignores, and little support for reliance upon
XPFs that currentpractice commonly relies upon.

